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 1 
IS THE BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE TRIVIAL? AMNESIA ABOUT 
CORPORATE LAW IN EUROPEAN TAKEOVER REGULATION 
 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle,

 David Kershaw,
**
  Matteo Solinas
***
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, after a long and difficult legislative process, the European Union adopted the 
Takeover Directive.
1
 The final product was widely viewed as a failure.
2
 For many it 
represented yet another example of how politics and interest groups interfere with the 
introduction of the regulation necessary for creating a level playing field in corporate law 
in the European Union; another example, of how domestic politics gets in the way of 
advancing the overall economic interests of the Union and its Member States.  
The primary reason for this sense of failure was the inability to reach agreement 
amongst the Member States that the so-called ‘board neutrality rule’ should be a 
mandatory rule which had to be implemented by all Member States, rather than, as the 
Directive provides, an optional rule.
3
 A neutrality rule provides restrictions on board 
activity once a bid has been commenced or is imminent. These restrictions prevent a 
unitary board of directors or a management board from using corporate powers provided 
to them to frustrate the bid without obtaining shareholder approval for using the powers 
for such a purpose. The term ‘neutrality’, whilst widely used, is somewhat misleading as 
the requirement is not that the board remains neutral. In all Member States the board is 
required to give its views – whether in favour or against - on the hostile bid4 and can 
legitimately search for an alternative and, in their view, more favourable suitor.
5
 It is only 
in relation to the use of board power to defend a bid where such a rule neutralises or 
disempowers the board in the absence of contemporaneous shareholder approval.  
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1
  Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids (OJ L142/12, 30.4.2004) (‘Takeover Directive’). 
2
 See for example ‘Watered-down EU takeover directive is a missed opportunity for open markets’ 
Financial Times (20 December 2003) observing that ‘Germany made common cause with the Nordic 
countries to make the new proposals' most meaningful provisions optional. That meant that company 
managements could still use poison pill defences without shareholder approval’; see also ‘EU reaches 
takeover code compromise’ Financial Time (28 November 2003). M Gatti, .Optionality Arrangements and 
Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive. (2005) 6 European Business Organization Law Review 
553, 561 observing that that .if we analyze the main reason why the [Takeover Directive] created so much 
dissatisfaction among the experts, we observe that its political failure is ascribed to the fact that the board 
neutrality rule is not binding’. 
3
 Articles 9 and 12 Takeover Directive. 
4
 Article 9(5) Takeover Directive. 
5
 Article 9(2) Takeover Directive. 
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In the United Kingdom a board neutrality rule, referred to in the UK as the non-
frustration principle, has been in place since the late 1960s.  Today the rule is set forth in 
Rule 21 of the Takeover Code and provides a general principled prohibition on 
frustrating board action together with a detailed set of specific rule-based prohibitions, 
including, for example, in relation to the issue of shares or options and the sale of assets 
and non-ordinary course transactions. The non-frustration rule was introduced in the UK 
in response to what was perceived to be the abusive use of board power to issue shares to 
fend off unwarranted bids in the 1950s and 60s. It was introduced at the same time that 
the UK’s Takeover Panel was formed, not as a result of direct government action but 
through the actions of market participants in the City of London who, under the shadow 
of possible government intervention, imposed both regulation and a regulator upon 
themselves.
6
  
Prior to the enactment of the Directive, a strong view developed in European 
policy and regulatory circles that the UK’s non-frustration rule represented a best practice 
approach to European Union takeover regulation.
7
 There were three primary drivers of 
this view. First, a harmonised board neutrality rule was necessary to generate a level 
playing field in the European single market that would enable the efficient organisation 
of European businesses: sand in the wheels of the market for corporate control 
necessarily gets in the way of efficient combinations. Secondly, this view reflected a 
strong shareholder sovereignty orientation that steadfastly viewed a contractual takeover 
offer as an investment decision for shareholders, not as a business decision which could 
justify board action. The third driver of this view was the prevalent distrust of 
management; a view driven by the dominant managerial agency cost framework of 
contemporary corporate law scholarship. From this viewpoint, although there may be 
shareholder friendly rationales for takeover defences, given the opportunity managers 
will use corporate power to resist a bid to protect themselves and their private benefits of 
control rather than to protect and benefit shareholders.
8
 The context within which the 
non-frustration rule was introduced in the UK also contributed to this best practice 
viewpoint. The UK’s non-frustration rule was formed outside of politics by the multiple 
constituencies of the City of London’s financial community. A rule which is untainted by 
the compromises of the political process is readily perceived to be economically sensible. 
Although government may have nudged the UK financial market place to regulate itself, 
the actual solutions reflect the preferences of the market place, which ultimately is 
concerned with shareholder value.  
Whether or not these drivers of the ‘best practice’ viewpoint are well founded is 
beyond the scope of this paper, although it is worth noting in passing that a degree of 
doubt has entered the UK debate and has recently been the subject of review both by the 
                                                 
6
  For an excellent account of the historical background leading to the adoption of the Takeover Code see J. 
Armour and D. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of 
US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727. 
7
  The High Level Group of Company Law Expects on Issues Relating to Takeover Bids (2000) (the Winter 
Report). 
8
  The Winter Report observed in this regard that ‘management are faced with a significant conflict of 
interest if a takeover bid is made…their interest is in saving their jobs and reputation instead of maximizing 
the value of the company for the shareholders. Their claims to represent the interests of shareholders or 
other stakeholders are likely to be tainted by self-interest. Shareholders should be able to decide for 
themselves’ (emphasis added) (at 21). 
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Takeover Panel and the UK Government.
9
 This ‘best practice’ policy debate is a second 
order debate which flows from the assumption that whether or not Member States have 
adopted the board neutrality rule makes a difference to whether or not boards of Member 
State companies can in fact use corporate power to resist bids. The debate and the 
political wrangling surrounding the status of the board neutrality rule in the Directive 
made a binary assumption that a Member State that has a mandatory neutrality rule 
prevents boards of its companies from using takeover defences without shareholder 
approval, and that a Member State that does not have a neutrality rule allows the boards 
of its companies to use corporate power to effectively resist unwanted bids, without 
having to ask shareholders for permission to do so. This binary assumption continues to 
drive the assessment of the Takeover Directive’s effectiveness. The post-implementation 
debate views the extent to which corporations in the EU are open to takeover unhindered 
by board action as a direct function of whether the Member State which governs the 
activities of the corporation has adopted the neutrality principle, or adopted it subject to 
the reciprocity principle.
10
 This assumption drives a view of the Directive’s success that 
looks to the before and after of the Directive’s implementation: how many Member 
States has a neutrality rule before and how many have it now; how many Member States 
had an unqualified neutrality principle before and now have a neutrality rule subject to 
the reciprocity requirement. Indeed, if this is the measure of the Directive’s success then 
important recent work shows that it has fallen short.
11
  
The problem with this assessment of success of the Takeover Directive and the 
problem with the process that produced the Directive is that this binary assumption on 
which it rests may not be, and we do not know whether it is, correct. Although it is 
clearly correct that a jurisdiction, such as the UK or Austria,
12
 that has adopted an 
unqualified board neutrality rule, prevents boards of its companies from using corporate 
power to frustrate a bid without obtaining contemporaneous shareholder approval, the 
flip-side of the assumption is more problematic. The debate on the use of board 
controlled takeover defences appears to assume that as takeover defences exist and are 
deployed in some jurisdictions, most importantly in the United States, that in all 
jurisdictions but for a board neutrality rule such defences would be available and, where 
                                                 
9
 See Takeover Panel, Review of certain aspects of the regulation of takeover bids (PCP2010/2) available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.pdf.; and the Panel’s 
Response Statement: http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf.  
10
 See European Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the implementation of the Directive on 
takeover bids (2007) particular its assessment of the impact of the adoption of the reciprocity principle 
allowing companies to dis-apply the neutrality rule where the bidder company is not subject to the rule. 
Those Member States that had a neutrality rule in the first instance and now have one subject to reciprocity: 
‘have increased the managements’ power to take frustrating measures without the approval of the 
shareholders…this development will very likely hold back the emergence of an open takeover market, 
rather than promote it.’ For financial media reports reinforcing this binary assumption see: ‘Doubts grow 
on efficacy of takeover directive’ Financial Times (June 12, 2006) reporting on an analysis by the 
European Group for Investor Protection on the implementation of the Directive; ‘EU Takoever Law in 
Tatters’ Financial Time (27 February 2007); ‘Expected surge in hostile bids turns spotlight on defences’ 
Financial Times (October 15, 2009). See also P.Davies, E.Schuster and E. van de Walle Ghelcke, The 
Takoever Directive as a Protectionist Tool (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 141/2010. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616). Note however that Davies et al engage with and, in our view 
incorrectly, reject the triviality argument.  
11
 See Davies et al, ibid. 
12
 Section 12 Übernahmegesetz (Austrian Takeover Law). 
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available, that they would be effective for resisting a bid for non-legitimate reasons such 
as to entrench management. However, it does not follow that a Member State that has not 
adopted the neutrality rule enables and permits directors of its companies to create and 
deploy takeover defences without obtaining shareholder approval. Whether it does so 
depends on the corporate law of that jurisdiction. And it does not follow that where a 
jurisdiction’s corporate law makes such defences formally available to boards that in 
practice they can be used by managers to protect themselves. Again, this depends on the 
corporate law of that jurisdiction.  
It is in our view surprising that so much human and political capital has gone into 
the enactment of the Takeover Directive and the assessment of its success or failure 
without first obtaining a comprehensive assessment as to whether or not, in each of the 
Member States, the adoption or rejection of the board neutrality rule makes more than a 
trivial difference to the defensive capability of the board. This article intends to make a 
contribution to this assessment. It does so by asking whether the board neutrality 
principle is trivial in three key European jurisdictions: the UK, Germany and Italy. It does 
so by asking whether the corporate law in these jurisdictions renders board controlled 
takeover defences available at all and if it does whether in these jurisdictions such 
defences are practically effective for resisting hostile bids. If takeover defences are either 
unavailable or practically ineffective in these three jurisdictions then it suggests that the 
European neutrality principle debate is far too much ado about nothing. If they are 
significant in some but not other jurisdictions then it suggests that a similar assessment of 
all Member States must be made before we can draw any conclusions about the effects of 
the Directive’s implementation; and that such conclusions cannot be based on the 
acceptance or rejection of the neutrality rule alone.  
 
 
1.  EFFECTIVE BOARD CONTROLLED TAKEOVER DEFENCES 
 
1.1 The European experience  
To assess whether corporate law in any jurisdiction would allow board controlled 
takeover defences to be constructed and used effectively one needs to understand what 
types of corporate action can have a defensive impact. For a jurisdiction such as the UK it 
is difficult to answer this question by looking only at the UK’s experience of hostile 
takeovers. The reason for this is, of course, that boards of listed companies have been 
prevented from experimenting with the production of such defences by the Takeover 
Code’s non-frustration rule which has been in place since the late 1960s. This meant that 
during the 1980s, the decade in which for the first time we saw a significant amount of 
hostile activity, boards and their advisors were not in a position to act creatively to 
fashion defences. However, although, prior to this date hostile bids in the UK were a 
relatively rare event, there are several pre-Takeover Code examples of boards deploying 
takeover defences. Most commonly boards attempted to prevent a bid by issuing a large 
 5 
block of shares to a friendly third party.
13
 Other examples of defences included offering 
to buy-back shares
14
 and the sale and leaseback of key assets.
15
   
In many other European jurisdictions although hostile takeovers have not, until 
recently, been subject to a non-frustration rule, other constraints have prevented boards 
and their advisors creatively exploring how corporate power could be deployed to resist 
bids. Most importantly in this regard is the fact that in many of those jurisdictions small 
and large companies alike typically have a controlling shareholder who has either a large 
economic holding in the company or controls the company through control enhancing 
mechanisms such as pyramids or multiple voting shares. In such companies hostile 
takeovers are excluded by the fact that control is not available for purchase without the 
agreement of the controller. Clearly in the absence of hostile takeovers boards of 
companies in these jurisdictions have not had an opportunity to explore the availability 
and effectiveness of board controlled takeover defences. Of course, in most such 
jurisdictions there have always been companies that are widely-held, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number of such companies is increasing. Nevertheless the pool 
of such companies remains small and the number of hostile events they have generated 
has been inconsequential.
16
 
 
1.2  The US Experience 
To understand the full range of ways in which corporate action could be used defensively 
we need to look at a jurisdiction which has experienced a significant amount of hostile 
takeover activity and yet has not been constrained in the development of takeover 
defences by a board neutrality rule or shareholder ownership structure.  Most importantly 
in this regard is the United States, which provides us with a, arguably complete, set of the 
imaginable ways in which corporate power can be used by boards to resist bids.  As 
followers of the US takeover defence debate will be well aware, in the United States there 
are a myriad of examples of takeover defences. Some of them can be put in place by the 
board acting alone, others require shareholder approval to amend the constitution, and 
others are imposed by State takeover statutes on companies that do not opt-out by 
amending the constitution.
17
 Here we are concerned only with board controlled defences 
that can be put in place without shareholder approval and only with those which have 
functioned effectively to deter or frustrate bids. In our view those defences can be 
categorized in three ways (in decreasing order of potency): the creation of poison pills 
through the issue of warrants; the restructuring of the company’s equity through share 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, TI Reynolds bid for British Aluminium and the battle for Metal Industries Ltd: see 
Armour and Skeel, above note 6 for an account of these events. 
14
 See Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch. 254 where the company funded a trust with a loan to enable the 
trust to offer to buy back shares at the share price the potential bidder had proposed.  
15
 See the sale and lease back put in place by the Savoy Hotel Ltd in 1953; see L.C.B. Gower, ‘Corporate 
Control: The Battle for the Berkeley’, (1955) 68 Harvard Law Review 1176. 
16
 This is of course not to say that although they are few in number, that they have had an inconsequential 
effect. Vodafone’s hostile bid for the widely-held Mannesman AG was instrumental in the then German 
Government’s opposition to a mandatory board neutrality rule. 
17
 For example, section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law providing for a business 
combination statute preventing ex-post merger or amalgamation of the target or its assets unless in effect 
the pre-bid board approved of the bidder’s takeover. 
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issues and buy-backs; and the sale of key assets in the company.
18
 We take Delaware 
corporations and Delaware corporate law as our reference points.  
 
The poison pill / shareholder rights plan 
As is well known, a poison pill or a ‘shareholder rights plan’ involves the issuance of a 
share warrant or option for each outstanding share. The warrant attaches to the share and 
is transferred with it. Upon issue the warrant is significantly out of the money and would 
therefore never be exercised by the holder. However, if a triggering event occurs the 
warrants are detached from the shares and the terms of the option are dramatically altered 
to enable the holder to purchase shares in the company at a discount. Typically the 
discount is 50% of the shares current price, but this is of course a function of the 
contractual terms that apply to the warrant which are determined, in a Delaware 
corporation, by the board. The triggering event is typically the acquisition of a certain 
percentage of shares, for example 15% or 20% of the corporations outstanding shares, 
without having obtained the target board’s prior approval. The ability to exercise the 
warrants and purchase shares at a discount following a triggering event does not apply to 
the bidder who triggers the pill. As the bidder is excluded, the pill when triggered results 
in significant value dilution for the bidder. Today the most common and potent pill is a 
flip-in pill that provides options to purchase shares in the target; a flip-over pill enables 
shareholders to buy shares in the bidder company or its subsidiary on the merger of the 
target with the bidder or its subsidiary. Importantly, the pill can be put in place by issuing 
an interim dividend of the warrants which does not require shareholder approval.
19
 The 
decision to refuse to approve the bidder or to redeem the warrants is a decision solely for 
the board.  
The value dilution resulting from triggering a pill means that no bidder ever 
crosses the threshold and triggers the pills. Pills are never triggered. They represent, 
therefore a very potent defensive tool, that has the distinct advantage of not affecting the 
company at all – no assets or shares are sold or deployed.  However, as has become clear 
in recent years, the potency of the pill is not dependent solely on the ability of the board 
to create a pill without asking for shareholder approval. As the board can approve of the 
bidder crossing the threshold or can redeem the pill outright to enable the bid to proceed, 
it is the resistance of the board not the pill that prevents a hostile bid from proceeding. 
Accordingly, launching a proxy fight to remove the board places considerable pressure 
on the target board to capitulate. If they do not and the proxy fight is successful the 
removal of the board and the appointment of members favorable to the bidder enables the 
bid to proceed. However, there is a small US hiccup in the logic of this response: namely 
the assumption that a shareholder meeting can be called against the will of the resisting 
board and, once called, that a majority of the directors can be removed. In many 
Delaware corporations this assumption would not be well founded: shareholders only 
                                                 
18
 We ignore business combination defences, that prevent the combination of the target with the bidder after 
a successful bid unless the target board approves the passing of a specified ownership threshold by the 
bidder (see for example, section 203 Delaware General Corporation Law). Although they are potent 
defences (second only to the pill) and place the power in the board to control the defence they are put in 
place either by a specific takeover statute (and therefore of no comparative relevance for us) or by 
shareholder amendment to the constitution. 
19
 Section 157 Delaware General Corporation Law.  
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have a right to call a meeting if the constitutional documents provide for this
20
 and in 
many corporations they explicitly deny it; and if a meeting can be called, or if the bid is 
timed in close proximity to the annual shareholder meeting, many corporations have a 
staggered board which means that only a third of the board come up from re-election 
each year and the remainder can only be removed at that meeting with cause,
21
 which is a 
high bar involving some form of illegality or breach of duty.
22
 It is, therefore, the basic 
rules of Delaware corporate law that render the pill potent; in the absence of such a basic 
rule set the pill’s potency is significantly compromised.   
 
Equity restructuring 
A longstanding mechanism for making it more difficult for a hostile bidder to acquire a 
company is to issue a significant block of shares to a friendly third party. Whether such a 
defence is available to the board depends upon whether the board must obtain 
shareholder approval to issue the shares or shareholder approval to issue the shares non 
pre-emptively. In the United States the only restriction on issuing shares is that the 
corporation has sufficient authorized share capital to issue the shares.
23
 If it does not then 
shareholder approval would be required to raise the corporation’s authorized share capital 
and the shareholders would then receive a say in whether or not they wished to approve 
of the defensive measure. However, most Delaware corporations have a significant 
reservoir of authorized share capital sufficient to enable a defensive share issuance 
without having to obtain shareholder approval. Nevertheless, it is important to observe 
that where the share issuance, although significant, leaves the new shareholder with less 
than a majority of the shares, whilst the share issuance reduces the probability that the 
hostile bidder will succeed it is by no means guaranteed to thwart the bid. This was seen 
most clearly in the UK in the late 1950s when  in response to unwanted attention of TI 
Reynolds, British Aluminum Ltd issued shares amounting to a third of its share capital to 
the Aluminum Company of America. TI Reynolds proceeded to successfully obtain 
control of the company.    
Hostile takeovers can also be deterred or frustrated by buying back or issuing 
shares. Buy-backs have two potential defensive purposes. First, the company could buy-
back the shares of the hostile bidder at a premium: a “bribe” to make the bidder go away. 
This defence is often referred to as “green mail.” Secondly, a buy-back can be used to 
enhance the economic interest and voting power of a friendly shareholder or insider. A 
buy-back in which the friendly shareholder or insider does not participate would increase 
such shareholder’s proportionate stake, reducing the probability of the hostile bid’s 
success. Such a buy-back could also give friendly third parties or insiders a blocking 
majority in relation to important shareholder votes (such as changing the articles of 
association) or bidder rights (such as a squeeze out right). In a Delaware corporation the 
                                                 
20
 Section 211(d) Delaware General Corporation Law. 
21
 Section 141(k)(1) Delaware General Corporation Law. 
22
 Ralph Campbell v Loews Incorporated 134 A 2d 565 (del.1957). 
23
 Note that if the Delaware Corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange the NYSE’s Listing 
manual requires shareholder approval for the issue of shares amounting to more than 20% of the 
outstanding shares at the time of issue (Listing Manual Rule 312.03(c)). 
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board is empowered by the Delaware General Corporation Law to buy-back shares.
24
  
There is no requirement to obtain shareholder approval.
25
 
 
Asset Sales / Crown Jewell Defences  
Asset sales as a takeover defence have a long pedigree in the United Kingdom
26
 and the 
United States. How this defence functions is straightforward. If the primary or significant 
objective of the bidder’s hostile bid is obtain control of a particular asset or division of 
the business then a simple way of making the bidder go away is to sell the asset either 
absolutely or contingently – if the bidder obtains control of the company.  In practice, 
however, asset sales many be difficult to deploy as core assets may not be separable from 
the rest of the business without damaging the business. Contingent sales may deter the 
bid and therefore avoid the need for separation but it may be difficult to find a third party 
willing to enter into such an arrangement. A contingent sale to an insider risks falling foul 
of self-dealing rules. A board of a Delaware corporation may sell corporate assets without 
obtaining shareholder approval provided that the sale does not involve all or substantially 
all of the corporation’s assets.27 
 
1.3 The building blocks for effective board controlled takeover defences 
The US experience points to two preconditions to the availability of board controlled 
takeover defences and to a further precondition to their effectiveness. The first 
precondition to availability is that the applicable corporate law enables these defences to 
be put in place without obtaining shareholder approval. We refer to this precondition as 
the ‘formal availability’ pre-condition. The second pre-condition is that, in relation to 
those defences that are formally available, general corporate law rules on the exercise of 
board power do not restrain, or excessively restrain, the use of those defences. In the 
United States, for example, the generally applicable corporate legal constraint on their 
use is a loyalty-based constraint. The courts will subject the defence to a standard of 
review designed to test the director’s loyalty. This standard is the well known enhanced 
scrutiny standard originally set forth Unocal Corporation v Mesa Petroleum
28
 which 
requires that that the directors’ identify a threat and establish a rational basis for that 
threat (the identification of a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness) and that the 
actions taken by the board are indeed responsive and proportionate to that threat (that the 
defensive action is reasonable in relation to the threat posed).   
The precondition to a formally available takeover defence’s effectiveness is that 
the basic corporate law rule set does not undermine its potency in practice. In Delaware, 
for example, the pill would be a much less potent creature if the shareholders in a 
Delaware corporation had a mandatory right to call a shareholder meeting and mandatory 
rights either to remove the board or instruct the board to remove the pill.   
                                                 
24
 Section 160 Delaware General Corporation Law.  
25
 Today green mail is rarely seen in the United States. There are multiple reasons for this including anti-
green mail charter amendments, the poison pill and disadvantageous income tax treatment (Section 5881 
Internal Revenue Code). See D. Manry and D. Strangeland, ‘Greenmail: A Brief History’ (2001) 6 Stanford 
Journal of Law, Business and Finance 217. 
26
 See above n 15 
27
 Section 271 Delaware General Corporation Law.  
28
 493 A2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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1.4 Legal standards and the unexpected 
In this article we measure the scope for effective takeover defences by reference to the set 
of board controlled takeover defences that have been deployed in the United States. Our 
German, Italian and UK corporate law analysis directly addresses these types of defences. 
Commentators have argued that a primary benefit of the broad and general board 
neutrality rule is that it prevents the use of board controlled takeover defences that we 
currently cannot envisage and which may be compliant with corporate law.
29
 This 
argument suggests a critique and limitation of our defence specific analysis: whether 
known takeover defences are trivial in our selected jurisdictions does not address the 
potential significance of the board neutrality rule in relation to those future, currently 
unforeseeable defences. 
In our view, for two compelling reasons, the strength of this argument is 
overstated. First, as we shall see in our analysis, in some jurisdictions, including the UK 
and Germany, broad rules that cover any board defensive actions are provided by 
corporate law; rules that are no less broad than a board neutrality rule. Secondly, whilst it 
is indisputable that a broad rule enables the regulation of future, currently unforeseeable, 
problems, in our view there are very good reasons to think that the future of board 
controlled takeover defences has no surprises in store.  The United States has provided a 
largely unrestricted laboratory for the innovation in takeover defences. The innovation 
has continued unabated for over a 30 year period. This innovation has given us: the flip-
in pill, the flip-over pill, the dead-hand and no-hand pills;
30
 a vast array of complex 
restructuring defences; and a long list of shareholder repellants in companies’ 
constitutional documents ranging from fair price rules,
31
 disgorgement rules,
32
 control 
acquisition rules
33
 to business combination rules.
34
 Innovations driven by strongly 
incentivized advisors have been subject only to two constraints: loyalty
35
 and non-
contravention of the statutory authority to manage and direct the company.
36
  
Two strong arguments can be made in opposition to this view. The first is that 
each corporate legal jurisdiction is systemically distinctive and, therefore, the product of 
innovation in one jurisdiction tells us only a limited amount about the possibilities of 
                                                 
29
 Davies at al, above at note 10, at 4-5.  
30
 A dead hand pill allows the redemption of the pill only by the directors who put the pill in place, even if 
they have been removed; a no-hand pill prevents redemption by newly appointed directors for a specified 
period of time. See, for example, Carmody v Toll Brothers, Inc 723 A2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) and 
Quickturn Design Systems v Mentor Graphics Incorporation 728 A2d 25 (Del.Ch.1998).  
31
 Rules that require the bidder in a two tier offer to pay the same price at the back end as at the front end. 
32
 Rules that provide for the disgorgement of any profit made by a unsuccessful bidder when selling his 
shares after the failed bid. See, for example, the disgorgement provision in the Pennsylvania Corporation  
Law, 15 PA. Cons. Stat. Ann Sections 2571-2576. 
33
 Control share acquisition defences, whether in the charter or in a takeover statute, prevent an unapproved 
bidder from voting purchased shares until the remaining shareholders authorize the voting of his shares.  
34
 See note 17 for a description of such a defence which may be provided by state takeover statute or placed 
in the corporation’s charter.  
35
 The loyalty standard is the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test set forth in Unocal Corporation  v Mesa 
Petroleum 493 A2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
36
 In Delaware this is set forth in section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See Carmody v 
Toll Brothers, Inc 723 A2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) and Quickturn Design Systems v Mentor Graphics 
Incorporation 728 A2d 25 (Del.Ch.1998).  
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innovation in another. As, for example, hostile takeovers have never been a part of the 
German corporate governance landscape, what would 30 years of innovation generate 
with the tools provided by German corporate law? We cannot know. However, relativism 
cannot completely tie our hands. From what we know about the corporate laws of 
different jurisdictions, Delaware boards, along with German boards, are situated at the 
board power/supremacy of a board/shareholder power spectrum. Furthermore, board 
controlled takeover defences are fashioned using corporate powers made available to 
boards: the power to issue shares and derivatives and to repurchase those shares and 
derivatives; the power to buy and sell assets; the power to spend and distribute corporate 
assets. These are the powers available to boards in most jurisdictions.  Indeed, as we will 
see in our analysis, the powers of US boards are in many respects greater than their 
counterparts in other jurisdictions. For these reasons, the claim that the US has acted as a 
universalist laboratory of takeover defences, and what it has not discovered no other 
jurisdiction will, is more than plausible. A second argument in opposition to this view, is 
that innovation in the United States has been crowded out by the effectiveness of the pill 
as a defensive technique: that is, the pressure to innovate was dampened by the existence 
of such a potent tool. But as is clear from the above analysis this is not correct for all 
companies. The pill’s potency is a function of the rules governing board removal which, 
in Delaware, is dependent on whether the board is staggered. Although many companies 
have staggered boards, a significant proportion do not
37
 and those without one lack a 
defensive mechanism that approaches the potency of the pill / staggered board 
combination. Target boards of those companies have strong incentives to innovate, and 
indeed they have, with limited success, continued to do so through dead-hand and no-
hand pills that attempt to restrict the redeemability of the pill by a newly appointed board. 
Of course one must never say never, but in our view innovation has largely run its 
course and now operates within established defence types – for example looking at the 
different ways in which you could put a pill in place or providing functional substitutes 
for the dilutive effect of a pill - and has not for some time provided a new and effective 
type of defence. Imaginable defence types appears to be one of the few areas of corporate 
law where history may have reached an endpoint. 
 
2.  IS THE UK’S NON-FRUSTRATION RULE TRIVIAL? 
 
In contrast to Germany and Italy, the UK has long had a board neutrality rule and has not 
altered its position as a result of the implementation of the Directive. The non-frustration 
rule remains mandatory and is not subject to a reciprocity qualification.  From the 
viewpoint of those committed to a harmonized mandatory neutrality rule, the UK’s 
position supports the efficient integration of European business, protects shareholders and 
upholds shareholder sovereignty. In implementing the Directive, had the UK changed its 
mind and, like Italy, opted to revoke the non-frustration rule, the UK would have entered 
the opposing side of the post-Directive impact assessment and would be an example of 
the way in which the Directive has actually undermined single market integration and 
shareholder protection and sovereignty. In the context of the UK, any impact conclusions 
                                                 
37
 As of 1998 a study that looked at 2,421 large companies found that 59% of them had staggered boards – 
V.K. Rosenbaum, Investor Responsibility Research Center: Corporate takeover Defenses (1998). 
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based on the UK’s adoption of the neutrality rule are incorrect. The effects on market 
integration and shareholder sovereignty of the UK’s adoption of the rule are trivial. Had 
it chosen to change its mind and on implementation revoked the neutrality rule, it would 
have made no significant difference to a UK company’s defensive capability. To see this 
we consider the availability of board controlled takeover defences in a UK world without 
the non-frustration rule.
38
  
 
2.1 Formal Availability 
A UK Poison Pill? 
A poison pill or shareholder rights plan could be put in place in the UK, however, to do 
so would require specific shareholder authorization. The board of a UK company is 
typically authorized through its articles of association, its primary constitutional 
document, to issue an interim dividend provided that it has sufficient profits available for 
distribution.
39
 Most companies articles do not require the shareholders to authorize such a 
distribution. However, under UK company law, since the implementation of the Second 
European Company Law Directive,
40
 boards cannot grant rights to buy shares without 
having obtained shareholder authorization to grant those rights.
41
  Most listed companies 
will provide annual rolling grants of authority to allot shares and, often, although not as 
commonly, to grant rights to subscribe for shares.
42
 Typically such rolling grants of 
authority enable an issue of shares of up to one third of the existing outstanding ordinary 
shares. However, the option grant for a poison pill would necessarily have to be much 
larger than this, as one warrant would have to be granted for each share. Accordingly the 
board would require specific shareholder approval to grant the warrants. Such approval 
would clearly have to explain to the shareholders why it was sought. However, in contrast 
to the non-frustration principle such authorization could be given ex-ante. With regard to 
the rights that attach to the warrants most companies’ articles empower the directors to 
set the terms of the warrant as ‘as they think proper.’43  As one warrant is issued for each 
share there is no concern with pre-emptive rights.
44
  
One concern about poison pills that is often identified by non-US corporate 
observers is the pill’s apparent discrimination between shareholders, or more precisely 
                                                 
38
 For a consideration of this issue in the UK context see D.Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: 
Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 267. 
39
 We assume here that there will be sufficient distributable profits for the distribution given the value of 
the option on issue. See article 70, Model Articles for Public Companies.  
40
 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC. 
41
 Section 549 Companies Act 2006.  
42
 Compare Vodafone Plc’s 2010 Annual General Meeting resolution in this regard (referring to grants) 
(http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/annual_general_meeting/2010_review_of_the_
year_and_notice_of_agm.pdf) with Marks and Spencer Plc’s rolling grant resolution (referring only to 
allotment) 
(http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/specific/investors/AGM/f0ca5adec426451b9d268155f8
053541/2010_Notice_of_Meeting).  
43
 See for example Vodafone Group Plc articles of association, regulation 11.1 (2010) (available at  
http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/corporate_governance/vgplc_articles_2010_ag
m.pdf) 
44
 Section 561(3) applies pre-emption rights to the grant of an option but not in relation to the allotment of a 
shares in exercise of the option.  
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between the bidder and other shareholders. In the United Kingdom, claims that a pill is 
invalid because it is discriminatory are unlikely to be successful. UK company law does 
not require the board to treat shareholders equally but to have regard to their fair 
treatment when acting.
45
 The Listing Rules which are applicable to listed companies go 
further than this by requiring in Principle 5 of the Listing Rules
46
 that the listed company 
‘treats all holders of the same class of [shares] that are in the same position equally in 
respect of the rights attaching to such [shares]’. In our view this requirement would not 
impinge on the ability to put in place a poison pill. A pill does not discriminate between 
shareholders rather it gives holders of shares a right that is conditional on the fulfillment 
of the warrant’s contractually specified conditions. A bidder who crosses the trigger 
threshold has not complied with those conditions and therefore cannot exercise the rights. 
Furthermore, any differential treatment does not apply to the rights ‘attaching to [the 
bidder’s] shares’ rather it applies to a separate right to buy shares.  
Accordingly, UK corporate law would enable a poison pill to be put in place, 
which formally at least, would give the board the power to approve or not approve of a 
particular bidder. Such a pill would, however, require shareholder approval.  
 
Equity Restructuring  
In the UK an equity restructuring defence that involved issuing shares to a friendly third-
party would be subject to significant shareholder control, rendering it in effect formally 
unavailable without shareholder support. As noted above an issue of shares requires that 
the shareholders in general meeting have granted authority to allot the shares.
47
 Such 
authority is granted by an ordinary resolution (a simple majority of the votes cast at the 
meeting). Shareholders commonly provide for rolling grants of authority for substantial 
blocks of shares, typically in the range of a third of the issued shares. Such a block would 
be large enough to significantly decrease the probability of success for a hostile bid. 
However, in addition to requiring authority to allot the shares, an issue to a third party is 
a non pre-emptive issue and requires that shareholders waive their pre-emption rights 
which are provided by sections 561 of the Companies Act 2006. Such rights must be 
waived by a special resolution (75% of the votes cast at the meeting).
48
 However, pre-
emption rights are not applicable in relation to any issue of shares where any part of the 
consideration is non-cash consideration.
49
 Furthermore, as with the authority to allot 
shares or grant options, shareholders of listed companies typically approve significant 
pre-emption right waivers on an annual basis without there being any specified purpose 
for the waiver. For example, Vodafone Plc at its 2010 annual general meeting granted a 
pre-emption right waiver in relation to up to 19% of its shares.
50
  
                                                 
45
 Section 172 Companies Act 2006. 
46
 The Listing Principles are set forth in Listing Rule 7.2. 
47
 In any event pursuant to section 564 of the Companies Act 2006, pre-emption rights do not apply to a 
bonus issue of shares.  
48
 For a public company pre-emption rights can be waivered by a waiver resolution or by a resolution 
amending the article to that effect (section 570 Companies Act 2006). Private companies can opt out of the 
pre-emption regime altogether by providing for an opt-out in their articles (section 567 Companies Act 
2006).  
49
 Section 565 Companies Act 2006. 
50
 Resolution 20 2010 Annual General Meeting, above note 42. 
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Such waivers appear to enable significant board controlled non pre-emptive issues 
of shares to friendly third parties. Such issues would clearly impact on the probability of 
success for the hostile bidder. Accordingly, it could be argued that whilst formally 
shareholders appear to control share issues, in practice they relinquish that authority to 
the board in relation to potentially large blocks of shares. This would appear to give the 
board significant scope to deploy an equity restructuring defence without seeking ex-post 
shareholder approval and when the ex-ante approval given did not amount to a consent to 
their defensive use. In practice, however, there is a significant amount of informal 
shareholder control over share issues in the UK. Institutional shareholders are very fond 
of their pre-emption rights. This is clearly evidenced by the formation in 1987 of the Pre-
Emption Group, an informal regulatory body, that specifies guidelines for companies and 
investors on pre-emption right waivers. The guidelines specify that in any one year that 
there should be no greater than 5% non pre-emptive issues and no more that 7.5% over a 
three period.
51
 This dramatically reduces the shares available for non pre-emptive issues 
when compared to the actual rolling waivers. Directors could of course ignore these 
informal guidelines and in a defensive context issue a much larger block of shares. 
However, any widespread abuse by companies of rolling pre-emption waivers for 
defensive purposes would almost certainly result in adjustments to the approvals and the 
guidelines. This could take the form of reduced rolling waiver percentage figures, to the 
5% recommendation or below, or keeping larger rolling waivers in place and imposing 
conditions on the authorization to allot the shares: for example, no issue is permitted once 
a bid is imminent or has commenced.
52
  
As regards share buy-back defences UK company law requires shareholder 
approval to carry out a buy-back. The nature of that approval varies depending upon 
whether the buy-back is purchased ‘on-market’ through a recognized investment 
exchange or ‘off-market’ with specified shareholders. In relation to an on-market 
purchase approval by a simple majority of the votes cast is required.
53
 This general 
authority may be given for a period of 18 months.
54
 Accordingly, if pre-approval has 
been given this does give the board some scope to enhance the size of friendly 
shareholders during a hostile bid. However, the approval must specify a limit on the 
number of shares being repurchased and as most UK listed company’s do not have large 
shareholders such repurchases are unlikely to significantly alter the balance of power in a 
takeover bid.   
If the repurchase is an off-market purchase, such as the repurchase of a block of 
shares from one shareholder - which could be used as a green mail defence - then a 
special shareholder resolution is required following disclosure of the sale contract.
55
 The 
selling shareholder and any of his associates are not allowed to vote their shares.
56
 
Accordingly a green mail defence requires contemporaneous disinterested shareholder 
approval.  
                                                 
51
 Pre-Emption Group, Disapplying Pre-Emption Rights – A Statement of Principles (2008), paras. 8 and 
10. 
52
 Section 551(2) Companies Act 2006 provides for the inclusion of condition on the allotment 
authorization. 
53
 Section 701(3) Companies Act 2006. 
54
 Section 701(5) Companies Act 2006. 
55
 Section 694-699 Companies Act 2006. 
56
 Section 695 Companies Act 2006. 
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Asset Sales / Crown Jewels Defences 
Of our three defence types, asset sales are the least potent. In addition to the problem of 
finding buyers for substantial assets and the difficulties, from buyer’s perspective, of 
carrying out due diligence and negotiating the sale within the time constraints of a UK 
takeover offer,
57
 many of the company’s assets will not be detachable from the other 
assets without damaging the company’s business. However, notwithstanding these 
limitations, an asset sale of a substantial amount of the UK company’s assets is clearly 
formally available to the board without shareholder approval. The Companies Act 2006 
does not address the issue of board power in this regard or the approvals required to sell 
assets. This is a matter for the articles of association. Typically in large companies the 
shareholders will not reserve power in relation to the sales of assets or transactions of a 
particular size, although it is clearly open for them to do so. From a company law 
perspective, therefore, board power in relation to sales of assets may well be unlimited. 
However, where the company is a listed company the United Kingdom Listing 
Authority’s Listing Rules require shareholder approval for any transaction that amounts 
to a Class 1 transaction which in effect requires shareholder approval for any transaction 
that has a value of more that 25% of the company’s value.58 This means  that sales of 
assets which amount to less than 25% of the company’s value can be sold without 
shareholder approval. Formally, therefore, in the absence of the non-frustration rule asset 
sales of less then 25% of the company’s value would be an available board controlled 
takeover defence. Indeed they represent the only defence that may be deployed without 
any shareholder involvement.  
 
2.2  General corporate legal restraints on the use of board controlled defences 
In the United Kingdom directors are not empowered by the corporate statute, as is the 
case in most jurisdictions,
59
 but rather are empowered by the shareholders who delegate 
authority to the board through the articles of association, 
60
 which the shareholders alone 
have the power to alter. Directors are subject to fiduciary duties which require them to 
exercise the delegated powers loyally.
61
 In the United Kingdom, prior to 2006 the 
common law obligation of loyalty in relation to the exercise of corporate power was the 
duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company.
62
 The Companies Act 2006 
codified this obligation, which is now the duty to promote the success of the company.
63
 
The codified duty, as with its predecessor duty, imposes a subjective standard on a 
                                                 
57
 Pursuant to the Takeover Code an offer could be commenced and closed within a 21 day period (Rule 
31.1). Typically the offer period will extend beyond this date. For a typical bid timetable see D. Kershaw, 
Company Law in Context (OUP, 2009), Web Chapter A: The Market for Corporate Control, 93-95 
(available at: http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215942/resources/01chapters/).  
58
 Listing Rule 10. 
59
 In a Delaware corporation the board is empowered by section 141(a) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law; the management board of a German Aktiengesellschaft is directly empowered by section 
76 of the German Stock Corporation Law; Article 2380bis of the Italian Civil Code directly empowers the 
board of an Italian company. 
60
  See, for example, article 3 of the Model Articles for Public Companies.  
61
  Cf. M. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart, 
2010). 
62
 Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] Ch. 304. 
63
 Section 172 Companies Act 2006. 
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director, to do what she considers is in the company’s interests. As our minds are closed 
to accurate judicial inspection, in application this standard is a rationality or plausibility 
standard: the director must show only that there is a rational basis for the decision in 
order to comply with the standard.
64
  
If the duty to promote the success of the company was the only general regulation 
of the exercise of corporate power, then UK company law would impose virtually no 
restraint on the use by boards of the formally available defences which we have identified 
in Part 2.1 above. A rational explanation is always available for the exercise of board 
controlled takeover defences. Such a rational explanation could include the need to 
facilitate an auction or to enhance the board’s bargaining power to ensure that 
shareholders obtain the best price; or even to prevent the success of the bid as neither the 
shareholders nor the market understands the true value of the company. However, the 
duty to promote the success of the company is not the only general applicable restraint 
provided by UK company law.  
A common law doctrine of English law, of longstanding heritage, known as the 
improper purpose doctrine imposes a rule-based restraint on the use of takeover defences 
which is remarkably similar to the Takeover Code’s non-frustration rule. This rule 
provides that corporate powers formally available to the board cannot be used to 
intentionally interfere with a takeover offer without having obtained shareholder approval 
to do so. In contrast to the Takeover Codes’ non-frustration principle, where shareholder 
approval must be obtained ex-post the imminency or commencement of the bid, under the 
improper purpose doctrine either ex-ante or ex-post approval would suffice.
65
 Importantly 
for understanding the scope for the board to deploy takeover defences in the UK it is 
important to stress that this is a generally applicable rule, it is not a loyalty based standard 
that attempts to determine whether the board has exercised the power loyalty.
66
  
The improper purpose doctrine does not have its roots in the takeover defence 
context but in cases where boards of directors used corporate power to interfere with 
voting control in the shareholder meeting. UK courts consistently invalidated such 
actions using a constitutional balance of power / shareholder rights-based theory of 
invalidity. In the 1864 case of Fraser v Whalley,
67
 for example, the board of directors 
issued shares to friendly third parties in order to dilute the holdings of a substantial 
shareholder. The directors claimed their actions were lawful as they were acting loyally 
in defence of the company’s interests. The court rejected this argument holding that the 
issue of shares for interfering with voting control was not a purpose for which the power 
had been ‘entrusted’ to the board. Formally the board had the authority to issue the shares 
but the court imposed implicit limitations on the delegation of that authority – it could not 
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 Regentcrest v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14. 
65
 Interestingly, one could argue that such a rule allowing for ex-ante approval is consistent with the 
Takeover Directive and, therefore, that the improper purpose doctrine accurately implements the Directive.  
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66
  Note, however, that the rules itself involving a prohibition subject to shareholder approval is structurally 
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concerned with loyalty in fact but rather with the possibility of conflict. See further, D. Kershaw, Company 
Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009), chapters 13 and 14.  
67
 [1864] 71 E.R. 361 (Ch. D. 1864). 
 16 
be used for the purpose of interference with voting control or, as the court put it: ‘to 
deprive him of his rights’. For the court in Fraser, voting control was so fundamental to 
shareholders that they could not be deemed to have authorized the board to intentionally 
interfere with their voting rights unless they had explicitly authorized such interference.  
In subsequent cases this theory of fundamental constitutional rights was extended 
to the hostile takeover context. In 1953, following an unsolicited approach to purchase 
the Savoy Group, the target’s board put in place a sale and leaseback arrangement for its 
one of its premier hotels, The Berkeley, in order to deter the bid. Although this case never 
made into the court room it did result in a Government instigated investigation by a 
leading QC, who found that the actions of the target board were not, in his view, a lawful 
exercise of its authority: 
[However] proper the motive behind [the sale and leaseback], it is not a purpose for 
which those powers were conferred on the Board.  Powers conferred by the shareholders 
on directors for the purpose of managing the business of the Company cannot be used for 
the purpose of depriving those shareholders of [their residual] control over the 
Company’s assets (emphasis added).68 
A decade later in the case of Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd,
69
 the issue of the intentional use of 
corporate power to defeat a hostile takeover by a bidder who was not a substantial 
shareholder was addressed by the courts for the first time. In this case, in order to repel a 
bid that the board viewed unfavourably, the board set up a trust for the benefit of the 
employees and issued shares and made a loan to the trust. The trust’s trustees consisted of 
the company’s CEO, the company’s auditor and an employee representative. The 
objective of issuing the shares was to prevent the bidder from controlling the company 
should he launch a successful takeover bid. The objective of the loan was to enable the 
trust to buy shares from the shareholders at the same price the bidder was proposing, if 
any shareholders felt aggrieved at having lost out on the opportunity to exit their 
investment. An action was brought by an affiliate of the potential bidder having acquired 
a nominal number of shares.  The court found that both the issuance of the shares and the 
loan were unlawful in the absence of explicit shareholder approval. Although the court 
found that the directors were acting in good faith in what they believed to be in the 
company’s best interests, and although the court accepted that formally the board had the 
power to issue the shares and make the loan, the court held that such actions amounted to 
illegitimate interference with the shareholders’ fundamental constitutional rights. The law 
did not ‘permit directors to exercise powers delegated to them…in such a way as to 
interfere by the majority with the exercise of its constitutional rights’ (emphasis added). 
Constitutional rights were understood by the court to mean the right to non-interference 
with voting control and the right to non-interference with the decision as to whether or 
not to accept an offer for the shares. Such interference could only take place if the 
shareholders had explicitly authorized it. Furthermore, the Court explicitly noted that any 
reasons given for such actions, no matter how compelling and honestly believed, were 
‘irrelevant’. 
                                                 
68
 See E. Milner Holland, The Savoy Hotel Limited and the Berkeley Hotel Company Limited: 
Investigation under Section 165 (b) of the Companies Act, 1948 (1954) [hereinafter, the “Savoy report”], 
27.. 
69
 [1967] Ch. 254. 
 17 
In the early 1970s the Privy Counsel in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd
70
 affirmed the position in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd. Although the case concerned the 
issue of shares to alter the control structure in the company, Lord Wilberforce made some 
important observations on the use of board power to interfere with a possible hostile bid: 
The right to dispose of shares at a given price is essentially an individual right to be 
exercised on individual decision and on which a majority, in the absence of oppression or 
similar impropriety, is entitled to prevail. Directors are of course entitled to offer advice, 
and bound to supply information, relevant to the making of such a decision, but to use 
their fiduciary power solely for the purpose of shifting the power to decide to whom and 
at what price shares are to be sold cannot be related to any purpose for which the power 
over the share capital was conferred upon them (emphasis added). 
For Lord Wilberforce the shareholder has a right to decide whether or not to sell his 
shares in response to a takeover offer and the board has no authority to intentionally 
interfere with the exercise of that right. The delegation of power from the shareholders to 
the board to manage the company does not extend to the authority to take such action. 
For the board to be able to do so requires explicit (ex-ante or ex-post) shareholder 
approval. This is a general rule applicable to any exercise of corporate power. A small 
exception to this is noted by Lord Wilberforce, as it was in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd: such 
actions may be taken to prevent ‘oppression or similar impropriety’. 
The legal principle that powers must be used for purposes for which they are 
conferred was codified in section 171(b) of the Companies Act 2006 as a duty to use 
corporate powers for proper purposes. Its codification as a duty is somewhat peculiar as 
the cases which it codifies do not refer to it as a duty,
71
 it was not enforced derivatively 
but rather as a personal right,
72
 and the broad idea of using powers for proper purposes is 
not a standard-like starting point for the analysis
73
 but a basis for explaining a 
constitutional rule which sets forth a default division of power in relation to questions of 
voting control and hostile bids.  Importantly, its codification as a duty does not affect its 
straightforward rule-based characteristics: board action that intentionally interferes with 
voting control is unlawful without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder approval.  
Arguably in one important respect this rule is different than the non-frustration 
principle in that it relies on the court to determine the purpose for which the action was 
taken. If the substantial purpose of the board action is not to interfere with the 
shareholders’ constitutional rights then the action is lawful. By contrast the non-
frustration rule is a rule that prevents any action that could frustrate the bid (without 
shareholder approval) regardless of whether the board would wish to take such action for 
reasons unrelated to the bid. This is a distinction, however, of limited import. The most 
powerful defences such as poison pills do not have any non-defensive purpose and in 
relation to those that do, for example share issues or asset sales, boards will struggle to 
persuade a court that sudden non-ordinary course transactions were taken for a 
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‘legitimate corporate purpose’ and that interference with the shareholder’s constitutional 
rights was only an ancillary effect.  
In our view the above analysis accurately reflects UK law today. However, there 
are two post-Howard Smith cases that arguable qualify the above position that need to be 
addressed. In the unreported High Court case of Cayne v Natural Resources,
74
 a case that 
involved the issue of shares that the plaintiff’s claimed was aimed at influencing the 
result of a proxy contest, Vice Chancellor Megarry observed that the rule set forth in 
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd ‘must not be carried too far’. What Megarry VC meant by this 
statement is that the strictness of the rule should not be understood to prevent all board 
action taken to protect its shareholders. Whereas Hogg suggests that reasons for action 
are ‘irrelevant’, Megarry VC questions whether that is always the case.  The example that 
animates his observations is where a competitor of a company takes an equity position in 
the company for the sole purpose of damaging the company, in order to enhance its own 
competitive position. The law cannot, Megarry VC opines, require the board to remain 
passive where the company is threatened with being ‘reduced to impotence and beggary.’   
The second case is Criterion v Stratford Properties LLC.
75
 In this case the board 
of Criterion, in response to a rumoured bid from an unwanted predator, put in place a 
defensive amendment to its joint venture agreement with Stratford. The amendment 
provided that Criterion would buy-out Stratford at a guaranteed 25% premium if the 
defence was triggered. There were two triggers to the defence: either a successful 
takeover of the company (by any bidder); or the removal of the Chairman or CEO of the 
company.  The rumoured bid never materialized. However, at a subsequent date the 
defence was triggered as a result of the removal of the CEO, at which point Stratford 
brought an action to enforce their sell-out right. At first instance and the Court of Appeal 
the legal question was whether entering into such an arrangement was a lawful exercise 
of corporate power. The High Court held that the defensive arrangement was unlawful as 
it was so disproportionate to the purported threat. However, in holding that the board’s 
action was invalid Hart J suggested that UK company law might provide somewhat 
greater flexibility for boards to interfere with the shareholder right to accept or reject a 
takeover offer. Hart J at first instance, relying on Cayne v Natural Resources and a 
Canadian case,
76
 suggested that such action might be lawful if a reasonable director 
would view the ‘economic damage’ to the company as justifying the board’s actions. The 
Court of Appeal considered the case but refused to decide whether, and if so under what 
circumstances, board controlled defensive action could be lawful. In the Court of 
Appeal’s view if intentionally defensive measures were per se unlawful then the actions 
in this case were necessarily unlawful, but even if such measures were lawful in theory, 
in this particular case the board’s actions were so disproportionate to the alleged threat 
that they could not plausibly have been taken in the corporate interest. Accordingly the 
Court of Appeal thought it was unnecessary in this case to decide whether defensive 
measures could ever be lawful.
 77
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To what extent is the position set forth in Hogg v Cramphorn and Howard Smith 
altered by these cases? With regard to Cayne, one might ask whether ‘impotence and 
beggary’ differs in any significant respect from the ‘oppression and similar impropriety’ 
exception referred to in Howard Smith. Furthermore, Megarry VC in Cayne is really 
concerned that the strictures of the Hogg rule may prevent the company from protecting 
itself from extremely abusive minority shareholder behaviour. What he appears to forget 
however, is that the rule in Hogg permits shareholders by ordinary resolution to approve 
protective board action, which they surely would do in the circumstances he describes. 
Perhaps the protective rationale Megarry VC refers to would support board action where 
time is of the essence and where there may not be enough time to call a meeting. It is 
however difficult to imagine circumstances in the voting control context where such 
flexibility would be necessary and, it is submitted, impossible to imagine in the context of 
a hostile takeover offer taking place in accordance with the Takeover Panel’s process 
rules (assuming the non-application of rule 21).   
Criterion at first instance is a more difficult case for the position articulated in 
Hogg and Howard Smith as it clearly expands the scope for reasoned-based justifications 
for board action beyond ‘oppression and similar impropriety.’ In our view the holding of 
this case is clearly inconsistent with authority: reasons for Hogg  and Howard Smith were 
irrelevant. However, in the unlikely event that it finds future fertile judicial sole it is 
submitted the scope for board action is very limited. The framework of analysis in 
Criterion is a rights-based framework or a power distribution framework: when can a 
threat justify interference with the shareholder right to decide to sell. It is a rights-based 
framework whose only UK judicial support is Cayne v Natural Resources. Accordingly, a 
reasonable director through the eyes of a UK court will require something close to 
impotence and beggary to justify defensive action and, as argued above, in the UK 
context it is difficult to imagine any such circumstances arising from a hostile bid 
governed by the Takeover Code. Accordingly, in relation to the limited defences which 
are formally available to boards of UK companies without requiring shareholder 
approval, such defences cannot be used in the UK without the board having obtained 
explicit authorization from the shareholders to do so. The only notable difference with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
judgment). The House of Lords held that the lower courts had not considered the issue of authority and 
directed them to do so. Whether this view of the lower courts judgments is correct is open to dispute. 
However, for our purposes what is important is that the House of Lord’s approach is consistent with the 
original understanding of the proper purpose doctrine as a rule setting forth the default constitutional 
division of power in relation to fundamental issues such as the interference with voting control or the right 
to decide on a takeover offer. However, the House of Lords took no position on the substantive question of 
when defences could be deployed without shareholder approval. One could argue that the very fact that the 
House of Lords referred the authority issue (whether apparent or ostensible) back to the lower courts is 
indicative of the House of Lords approval of the fact that defences may be deployed without shareholder 
approval. However, it is important to note that no UK court has said that board action can never, without 
shareholder approval, interfere with fundamental shareholder rights. Regarding actual authority Hogg v 
Cramphorn and Howard Smith both accept that the board may take such action to avoid “oppression or 
similar impropriety”. With regard to ostensible authority it is possible to envisage circumstances in which 
the board takes action to interfere with fundamental rights but the third party is unaware of the voting 
control or takeover implications of the action, in which case the board would have ostensible authority to 
take the action. Accordingly, for both Hogg and Howard Smith it is possible that the board may have actual 
or ostensible authority and, therefore, no substantive implication can be read into the House of Lords 
authority direction. Our thanks to Edmund Schuster for discussion of this point. See Criterion Properties 
Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28. 
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non-frustration rule is that such approval can be given prior to the target board becoming 
aware of any bid.   
 
2.3 Practical effectiveness  
An important distinction between company law’s regulation of takeover defences and the 
board neutrality rule is that it is possible under company law to make defences available 
to boards through ex-ante shareholder approval when no bid is on the horizon. Under the 
non-frustration rule only ex-post approval would allow the board to deploy the defence. 
This means that UK company law enables the attentive and informed shareholder to elect 
to take the risk that defences may be used to benefit management and not the 
shareholders. In any such shareholders’ view those risks would be outweighed by the 
potential benefits of defences.  Of course, this ex-ante flexibility also enables the board to 
take advantage of rationally apathetic or unattentive shareholders to obtain approval for 
the construction and deployment of defences without those shareholders having given 
considered thought to whether making them available is appropriate. There is some 
support from the United States to suggest that informed shareholders would take this 
risk,
78
 and strong evidence that they would be anything other than apathetic in the face of 
requests to approve them.
79
 We do not have space here to consider this debate in detail 
and refer the reader to discussion elsewhere.
80
 Here we are concerned with the scope for 
the board to use the defences made available by shareholders to entrench themselves 
rather than for legitimate corporate or shareholder regarding objectives.  
A widely-held view within the European takeover debate is that if you make 
defences available to directors then most likely they will use them to further their own 
interests.
81
 However, the scope to use defences to further a manager’s own interests in 
clear disregard of the shareholders’ interests is a function of the broader corporate 
governance landscape in the applicable jurisdiction. As we observed in Section 1 above, 
the potency of a poison pill in the United States is dependent on the board being a 
staggered board. As the removal right for a staggered board is a with cause removal right, 
in order for a hostile bidder to obtain control over the board she must wait for two annual 
shareholder meetings – removing a third of the board at the first meeting and a third at 
the second. In the UK the mandatory removal right is a without cause right enabling the 
removal of the whole board at a single general meeting by simple majority vote and 
without any need to justify the removal.
82
 Furthermore, a general meeting can be swiftly 
called at any time upon the initiative of the shareholders themselves provided that a group 
                                                 
78
  See M. Klausner, ‘Institutional Investors, Private Equity and Anti-takeover Protection at the IPO Stage’ 
(2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 755, 760 detailing evidence that a significant majority 
of Private Equity firms who bring their portfolio companies to market ensure that those companies have a 
potent staggered board / poison pill defence in place (as poison pills can be adopted after a bidder 
approaches the company, in effect a company with a staggered board in the US always has a staggered 
board / poison pill combination).   
79
 See Klausner, ibid, detailing the contemporary voting patterns when shareholders are asked to amend the 
charter to stagger the board. Based on a report from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Issues 5 (2001) 
Klausner observes that 59% of institutional investors report that they vote against such proposals. 
80
 See Kershaw, above note 38. 
81
 See note 8 above.  
82
 Section 168 Companies Act 2006. 
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of shareholders representing 5% of the shareholder body requisitions the board to call a 
meeting.
83
 In many UK listed companies that would require the agreement of only 2 or 3 
institutional shareholders.
84
 Pursuant to UK company law such a meeting could be called 
within a minimum time period of 49 days.
85
 Accordingly, any board that refused to 
redeem a pill where the shareholders predominantly favoured the bid would be destined 
for swift removal in order to enable the bid to proceed. In the alternative a shareholder 
meeting could be called to instruct the board to remove the pill. Such an instruction 
would require a special resolution (75% of the votes cast at the meeting) but given the 
low voting rates at general meetings in UK companies such a resolution could be passed 
with significantly less than 75% of the outstanding shares.
86
  
In relation to other possible defences such as the issue of shares which benefit 
from rolling allotment and pre-emption right waiver approvals, or the use of an asset sale 
defence, the ability to replace the board to prevent the action or to instruct the board to 
desist from proceeding would be ineffective as the corporate action could be 
implemented before a meeting could be called.  However, the basic rule set of UK 
company law still operates as an important constraint on the use of such defences. Any 
deployment of defences against the wishes of the majority of shareholders would risk 
subsequent removal by those shareholders. In contrast to the United States, in the UK the 
rules governing the removal of directors and the rules on the calling of shareholder 
meetings do not guarantee the board a period of time during which shareholder tempers 
can be cooled. Accordingly, in the UK not only does the use and, typically, the 
construction of takeover defences require shareholder approval, once made available the 
scope to deploy them for entrenchment purposes is very limited.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The above analysis shows clearly that if the objective of the board neutrality rule is to 
protect shareholders from managerial abuse or to affirm their sovereignty it is of trivial 
consequence in the United Kingdom. Its absence would, however, open the door to the 
increased availability and use of board controlled takeover defences where shareholders 
ex-ante elect to make them available. Importantly, such defensive availability would be 
an exercise of shareholder sovereignty; one that the board neutrality rule denies them. 
Whether such an increase in the use of takeover defences would place additional sand in 
the wheels of the market for corporate control is unclear. On the one hand, where 
shareholders, having ex-ante elected to trust the board by empowering it to use defences, 
do not challenge their use when a bid materializes then this could inhibit transactions that 
would have happened but for the removal of the non-frustration rule. However, in the 
absence of those defences such shareholders would surely in any event have followed 
management’s lead and have rejected what the board told them was an inappropriate 
offer. On the other hand, where shareholders balk at the deployment of the defences they 
                                                 
83
 Section 303-305 Companies Act 2006 as amended by The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) regulations 
2009 No.1632.  
84
  On shareholder ownership in the UK see D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials 
(OUP, 2009) 171-175. 
85
  Section 304(1) provides that the board must call the meeting within 21 days from the date the meeting 
was requisitioned and for a date not more that 28 days later. 
86
 Article 4 of the Model Articles for Public Companies provides an example of such an instruction right. 
Most listed companies provide for a similar instruction right.  
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approved of ex ante then directors, aware of the shareholder friendly context of UK 
corporate governance and the institutional structure of UK shareholder ownership, are 
unlikely to aggressively deploy those defences. If this analysis is correct the removal of 
the non-frustration rule and the possible (shareholder approved) increase in the 
availability of takeover defences would also have a trivial impact on activity levels in the 
market for corporate control.  
  
3. IS A BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE TRIVIAL FOR GERMAN COMPANIES? 
 
The central provision of German law addressing the problem of defensive measures 
adopted by the target’s management board is section 33 of the Securities Acquisition and 
Takeover Act.
87
 The provision was adopted in 2001 and was not altered as a result of the 
implementation of the Takeover Directive.  
There were two primary drivers of the Act’s adoption. The first was the rejection 
of the proposal for a Takeover Directive by the European Parliament in 2001. In 
anticipation of European legislation and in accordance with the Common Position for the 
Takeover Directive of 19 June 2000,
88
 which in turn was based on the UK Takeover 
Code,
89
 early drafts of the German law had contained a strict non-frustration requirement 
addressed at both the management and the supervisory board. Following the failure to 
adopt the proposed Directive, and with the future of the European initiative in doubt, the 
German legislature was unconstrained by European demands and became more 
susceptible to voices critical of a broad neutrality principal.
90
 The second driver of the 
Act’s adoption was that the German public’s view of board neutrality had soured after 
                                                 
87
 Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, Law of 20 December 2001 (Federal Law Gazette I p 3822), 
as last amended by Art 3 of the Law of 30 July 2009 (Federal Law Gazette I p 2479). Section 33 reads: 
Actions of the Board of Management of the Target Company.  
(1) After publication of the decision to make an offer and until publication of the result pursuant to 
section 23(1) sentence 1 no. 2, the board of management of the target company may not take any actions 
which could prevent the success of the offer. This does not apply to actions which a prudent and 
conscientious manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid would have taken, to endeavour to find 
a competing offer, or to actions consented to by the supervisory board of the target company. 
(2) If the general meeting authorizes the board of management prior to the period referred to in 
subsection 1 sentence 1 to take actions falling within the competence of the general meeting in order to 
prevent the success of takeover bids, such actions shall be specified in detail in the authorization. The 
authorization may be granted for a maximum term of 18 months. The resolution by the general meeting 
requires a majority of at least three quarters of the share capital represented at the vote; the articles of 
association may provide for a larger majority and further requirements. Any actions by the board of 
management on the basis of an authorization pursuant to sentence 1 shall require the consent of the 
supervisory board. 
[Translation by BaFin.] 
88
 Common Position (EC) No 1/2001 of 19 June 2000 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view to 
adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on company law concerning takeover 
bids,  2001 OJ C 23/1. 
89
 For the text of the German draft version see L Röh in W Haarmann and M Schüppen (eds), Frankfurter 
Kommentar zum Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Recht und 
Wirtschaft, 3d ed 2008), § 33/6. 
90
 In particular, trade unions and some industrial undertakings voiced concerns, see See H Krause and T 
Pötzsch in HD Assmann, T Pötzsch and UH Schneider, Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz 
(Cologne: Otto Schmidt 2005), § 33/17. 
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first proposals for the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act had been circulated, 
mainly as a result of the prolonged takeover battle between Vodafone and 
Mannesmann.
91
 
 Section 33 prohibits target board defensive action that has not been approved by 
the shareholders. Approval may be given ex-ante, for a period of up to 18 months prior to 
the commencement of the bid.
92
 However, this broad prohibition is effectively nullified 
by several exceptions contained in section 33. The management board may take actions 
that are outside the normal course of business without authorization by the general 
meeting, even if they have not yet been partly or fully implemented, provided that ‘a 
prudent and conscientious manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid would 
have taken’ the same action.93 More importantly, defensive action is permissible if 
consented to by the supervisory board of the target.
94
 The board neutrality rule only 
applies to the management board,
95
 who have sole responsibility under German law to 
manage the company.
96
 However, members of the management board and the 
supervisory board are subject to similar conflicts of interest in a takeover situation: both 
have private benefits of control that are placed in play by the hostile bid. Translated into 
the unitary board context, consisting of executive and independent non-executive 
directors, the effect of the exception is to allow for board controlled defensive measures 
when the board elects to deploy them. 
Accordingly, as has been acknowledged in the literature, the German legislature 
attached greater importance to the autonomy of directors to assess whether a bid is in the 
interest of the company and all affected stakeholders, than to the interests of the 
shareholders in controlling the use of takeover defences.
97
 This is in line with the 
philosophy underlying directors’ duties in the German stock corporation. While the Stock 
Corporation Act is silent on the question of in whose interests directors shall act, the 
relevant provisions
98
 are commonly interpreted as requiring the management board to 
consider the interests of the shareholders, employees, and society at large.
99
 Furthermore, 
                                                 
91
 After eventual adoption of the Directive, companies were given the option of electing the more restrictive 
European neutrality rule (Art. 9 of the Directive) by resolution of the general meeting and amendment of 
the articles, see s 33a Securities Acquisitions and Takeover Act (the Directive requires that companies be 
given the opt-in if the Member State does not provide for a mandatory non-frustration principle, see Art. 
12(2) Takeover Directive). Furthermore, as permitted by the Directive (Art. 12(3)), the German Act 
contains a reciprocity rule which provides that the general meeting of a company that has adopted the 
stricter neutrality rule may resolve that these rules shall not apply if the company becomes the target of a 
bidder that does not operate under corresponding restrictions (s 33c). In that case, the default rule of s 33 
governs the takeover. The European breakthrough (Art. 11 of the Directive) is also contained as an opt-in in 
the German Act (s 33b). 
92
 Section 33(1), Sentence 1, and s 33(2). 
93
 Sentence 2 of s 33(1). 
94
 Sentence 2 of s 33(1). This exception was included in the last stages of the legislative procedure, after the 
draft Takeover Directive had been rejected in the European Parliament, see H Krause and T Pötzsch in 
Assmann et al., n 90 above, § 33/17. 
95
 Sentence 1 of s 33(1). 
96
 Section 76 Stock Corporation Law. 
97
 L Röh, n 89 above, § 33/2. 
98
 In particular s 76(1) Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), Law of 6 September 1965 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p 1089), as last amended by Art 1of the Law of 31 July 2009 (Federal Law Gazette I p 2509).  
99
 Section 70(1) of the Stock Corporation Act 1937 contained an express provision to the effect that the 
management board shall manage the company ‘for the benefit of the undertaking and its employees and as 
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there is no order of priority in relation to these interests. Rather, the board is expected to 
decide on a case-by-case basis and is accorded discretion as to how to reconcile the 
interests where they conflict.
100
 
 The change in the German Government’s stance towards the neutrality rule, and 
the contentious nature of the political and legal debate
101
 leading up to the enactment of 
Section 33 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, suggests that the decision as 
to whether to adopt or reject the board neutrality rule mattered to the defensive capability 
of the management boards of German stock corporations. Below, following the structure 
adopted in the other sections of this article, we ask whether this is the case. 
3.1 Formal availability 
A German Poison Pill? 
Shareholder rights plans are not a common takeover defence in Germany. One possible 
reason for this is that they are not necessary. The German corporate landscape is 
characterised by large block holdings and cross shareholdings, which insulate many 
companies from hostile takeovers. In addition, until the reforms of 1998,
102
 shares with 
multiple voting rights and voting caps were permitted, further stifling the market for 
corporate control.
103
 However, notwithstanding these structural impediments to hostile 
takeovers, another reason why shareholder rights plans have not featured prominently in 
Germany is because the legislative environment regarding the issuance of naked 
warrants
104
 is less flexible than in the United States and the freedom of contract required 
to fashion effective poison pills is more restricted. 
 Dividend payments can, in general, only be made on the basis of a shareholder 
resolution deciding on the appropriation of the balance sheet profit.
105
 As an exception, 
the management board may be authorized in the articles to make an advance payment. 
However, such authority is subject to several restrictions. First, the payment can only be 
made after the close of the business year and only if the preliminary annual accounts 
show a profit for that business year.
106
 Secondly, the dividend must not exceed half of the 
current annual profit and of the balance sheet profit of the previous year.
107
 Thirdly, the 
declaration of the dividend must be approved by the supervisory board.
108
 Fourthly, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the common good of the people and the Reich requires’. Not only because of its political undertones, but 
also because the legislature believed that the social obligations of management were self-evident and that 
an explicit provision was, therefore, unnecessary, this formulation was left out when the Stock Corporation 
Act was reformed in 1965. See W Hefermehl and G Spindler in B Kropff and J Semler (eds), Münchener 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, vol. 3 (Munich: Beck, 2d ed 2004), § 76/53. 
100
 ibid. The rejection of a monistic view of the corporation with the shareholders at its epicentre is 
reinforced by Art 14(2) of the German Constitution, which provides that ‘property entails obligations’ and 
that ‘its use shall serve the public good’ (Sozialbindung des Eigentums). 
101
 See T Pötzsch in Assmann et al., n 90 above, Einl. 27. 
102
 Law of 27 April 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I p 786) (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich). 
103
 Multiple voting rights are now generally prohibited for the stock corporation in s 12(2) Stock 
Corporation Act and voting caps for public companies in s 134(1) Stock Corporation Act. 
104
 A naked warrant is a warrant that is issued without an accompanying bond. 
105
 Section 174 Stock Corporation Act. 
106
 Section 59(2). 
107
 Section 59(2). 
108
 Section 59(2), (3). 
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law generally envisages payment of dividends in cash. Dividends in kind are (now
109
) 
permitted if the articles so provide, but again it is necessary to procure a resolution of the 
general meeting to authorize this.
110
 Thus, as compared to other countries, for example 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the issuing of warrants as a dividend is 
cumbersome and the management board has limited flexibility in terms of timing.
111
 
 These dividend restrictions notwithstanding, the objective of a poison pill can 
theoretically be achieved by means of naked warrants or convertible bonds. However, the 
use of both devices as takeover defences is problematic. In contrast to UK law, the 
German Stock Corporation Act provides for several comprehensively regulated forms of 
capital increase  that follow (partially) distinct rules. The law envisages as the regular 
form of capital raising the increase of capital against contributions.
112
 This terminology is 
somewhat misleading, because other types of capital increase, namely contingent and 
authorized capital,
113
 also require the subscribers to make contributions. The distinctive 
feature of a capital increase against contributions is that the capital increase has to be 
carried out ‘without undue delay’.114 It becomes effective once the requested contribution 
has been paid up
115
 and the capital increase is registered in the register of companies.
116
 
Authorized capital, on the other hand, allows the management board greater flexibility in 
deciding about the timing and conditions of the capital increase. The management board 
can be granted authorization in the articles for a period of not more than five years to 
issue and allot shares and determine whether preemptive rights should be excluded.
117
 In 
that case, the amended articles need to be registered in the register of companies,
118
 but 
the capital increase is not effective, and contributions do not need to be paid up, until the 
management board decides to issue the new shares.
119
 Finally, contingent capital can be 
created by resolution of the general meeting for the purpose of meeting conversion or 
subscription rights of holders of convertible bonds, preparing for a merger, or granting 
subscription rights to employees and members of the management of the company.
120
 
This list is exhaustive.
121
 Once provided for in the articles, the capital increase is 
                                                 
109
 Amendment of the Stock Corporation Act by Law of 19 July 2002 (Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz), 
Federal Law Gazette I p 2681. 
110
 Section 58(5). 
111
 For this reason, the practical relevance of s 59 Stock Corporation Act is insignificant, see C 
Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht (Munich: Beck, 22d ed 2009), § 30/21. 
112
 Sections 182-191. 
113
 The rules on the contingent capital increase are laid down in ss 192-201 Stock Corporation Act; those on 
the authorized capital in ss 202-206. The fourth, and last, form of capital increase is an increase from the 
company’s reserves, ss 207-220. It is not relevant for our purposes. For an overview in English see G 
Wirth, M Arnold, R Morshäuser and M Greene, Corporate Law in Germany (Munich: Beck, 2d ed 2010), 
pp 173-189. 
114
 Imperial Court (RG), RGZ 144, 138, 141-142. 
115
 The requested contribution must be at least one quarter of the par value plus the premium in full, ss 
36(2), 36a Stock Corporation Act. 
116
 Sections 188, 189 Stock Corporation Act. 
117
 Section 203(2). 
118
 Section 181. 
119
 Sections 203(1), 189. 
120
 Section 192(2). 
121
 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (Munich: Beck, 9th ed 2010), § 192/8. 
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contingent upon the actual exercise of the conversion or subscription rights by the holders 
of the rights.
122
 
 Accordingly, pursuant to German corporate law contingent capital is required in 
relation to warrants, but the contingent capital provisions only contemplate the use of 
naked warrants as a means of performance based remuneration for employees and 
managers of the company.
123
 Lower courts and commentators addressing the issue have 
concluded that it is not legally possible for the company to issue naked warrants in other 
cases.
124
 As currently regulated in the Act, stock options for employees and management 
are not suitable as a defensive measure. Their volume is restricted to ten percent of the 
company’s share capital,125 and the law now provides for a minimum holding period of 
four years.
126
 In any event, their issuance requires a resolution of the general meeting 
adopted by qualified majority (majority of not less than 75 percent of the legal capital 
present and voting).
127
 
 In theory some of these restrictions could be circumvented by a carefully 
structured convertible bond which has attached warrants issued to the existing 
shareholders. The issuance of convertible bonds involves a similar procedure to that of 
warrants. It must be based on a resolution of the general meeting adopted by qualified 
majority.
128
 The general meeting can authorize the management board to issue the 
convertible bonds with attached warrants for a period of not more than five years.
129
After 
issuance (and usually expiration of a period of time specified in the bond indenture) the 
warrants can be separated from the bonds and traded independently. The capital 
underlying the warrants can be provided as contingent capital, which again requires a 
resolution of the general meeting adopted by qualified majority.
130
 The volume of the 
contingent capital (and accordingly, therefore, that of the subscription rights) is limited to 
half of the company’s share capital.131 In theory, therefore it would be possible to place a 
significant number of warrants in circulation through a nominally priced convertible 
bond, say one cent per bond, to be purchased by the existing shareholders.
132
 However, in 
order to be convertible into shares the conversion price would also have to be nominal in 
such a case. While the management board has discretion to determine the terms and 
conditions of the bond, which would include the triggers to being able to exercise the 
                                                 
122
 Section 200. 
123
 Section 192(2) no 3.  
124
 For references see A Fuchs in B Kropff and J Semler (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 
vol. 6 (Munich: Beck, 2d ed 2005), § 192/48; U Hüffer, n 121 above, § 221/75. 
125
 Section 192(3). 
126
 Section 193(2) no 4. For more details on stock options as a defensive measure see H Krause, ‘Die 
Abwehr feindlicher Übernahmeangebote auf der Grundlage von Ermächtigungsbeschlüssen der 
Hauptversammlung’ (2002) Betriebs-Berater (BB) 1053, 1060 (coming to the same conclusion as here, 
namely that stock options are not effective as a defensive measure). 
127
 Section 193(1). 
128
 Section 221(1). The articles may reduce the majority requirement from 75% to simple majority.  
129
 Section 221(2). 
130
 Section 192(2) no. 1. Theoretically, s 182 (capital increase against contributions) or s 202 (authorized 
capital) also constitute possible methods to create the underlying capital, but they are less convenient (see 
Hüffer, n 121 above, § 221/59). All three methods require a shareholder resolution. 
131
 Section 192(3). 
132
 We stress the nominal nature of the bond as shareholders are unlikely to authorize the issue of 
convertible bonds to a third party that contains potentially dilutive warrants, but at the same time 
shareholders may not wish to use their capital to purchase a non-nominal corporate bond. 
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warrants,
133
 the conversion price must be fixed by the general meeting in the resolution 
that creates the underlying capital.
134
 Companies usually either specify a minimum price 
(floor) or a maximum markdown. This is considered to be in accordance with the 
requirements of the Stock Corporation Act by most, but not all commentators and 
courts.
135
 Notwithstanding the legality of such a resolution, the low floor would alert 
shareholders to the intention of the management board to deploy a takeover defence as 
the nominal bond could not serve any other function. In addition, convertible bonds, even 
if nominally priced, are of course not simply issued to a passive third party; rather they 
require an active contracting party.
136
 Thus, management must be able to muster 
sufficient enthusiasm from shareholders to actually subscribe for a large number of 
bonds. In consequence, nominal convertible bonds with warrants cannot be put in place 
without both ex ante shareholder approval, with shareholders being fully aware of the 
intention of the management board to use the bond as a poison pill, and the willingness 
by a significant number of shareholders to actively purchase the bonds and detachable 
warrants. 
 An alternative way in which management could put in place a device that 
resembles a poison pill is to issue an ordinary convertible bond and to include in the 
bond’s terms and conditions a change of control clause that may provide, for example, for 
an adjustment of the conversion price where a bidder acquires a specified percentage of 
the target’s capital. Theoretically, the management board could also structure the bond in 
a way that makes it effectively redeemable, for example by retaining discretion as to 
whether and to what extent to adjust the conversion price. Such convertible bonds 
(without the redemption option) have in fact been put in place in the recent past. They 
were ostensibly issued for financing purposes and have neither been tested as a takeover 
defence in an actual bid nor challenged by dissenting shareholders.
137
 A suspicion 
remains, however, that they were used for defensive purposes.
138
 The change of control 
clauses usually provide for staggered adjustments, for example a reduction of the 
conversion price by 25 percent if the change of control occurs within one year after 
issuance, by 19 percent during the second year, 12 percent during the third year, six 
percent in the fourth year, and no reduction thereafter.
139
 This contractual arrangement is 
functionally identical to a poison pill because the bidder’s holding – assuming he did not 
participate in the convertible bond issue on a pro-rata basis at an earlier date - is diluted 
significantly if a sufficient number of bondholders exercise their conversion right and the 
reduction of the conversion price is substantial. However, the discretion of the 
management board and the scope of possible reductions of the conversion price are 
restricted by the requirement that the (reduced) price must continue to be above the 
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minimum which is set in the shareholder resolution authorizing the issue of the bonds.
140
 
Subject to this requirement, shareholders could in theory authorize the directors to issue a 
convertible bond that could subsequently be subject to a dilutive conversion price set by 
management (without the shareholders explicitly consenting to any reductions in the 
conversion price). However, if issued to anyone other than the shareholders themselves, 
in contrast to a poison pill, the benefits would accrue to the third party creditors and not 
the shareholders. For that reason it seems highly unlikely that it could be used by 
managers as a defence unless the managers persuade the shareholders to put the pill in 
place by buying the bonds themselves. If they were to do so that would amount in effect 
to explicit ex-ante approval for the defence. Furthermore, any attempt to issue such bonds 
to third parties would be subject to significant restrictions imposed by the regulation of 
pre-emption rights. 
 According to the Stock Corporation Act, shareholders have pre-emption rights not 
only in share issues, but also when convertible bonds are issued.
141
 Consequently, 
shareholders must approve both the issue of the bond and the waiver of the pre-emption 
rights.
142
 The waiver requires a majority of at least 75 percent of the votes cast, even if 
the articles provide for a lower majority for the issuance of the bond.
143
In addition, two 
further pre-emption right restrictions are applicable. First, the intention to exclude the 
pre-emption rights must be disclosed in the form prescribed in the statute and 
management must prepare a report for the general meeting describing the reasons for the 
exclusion.
144
 Second, the resolution is voidable if the issue price is ‘inadequately low’.145 
What is inadequate is not defined in generally applicable quantitative parameters but 
depends on the circumstances of each case and the interests of the company.
146
 The 
provision is phrased in sufficiently general terms to allow some deviation from the stock 
market price of the company’s shares or the company’s ‘true’ value according to the 
fundamentals. However, this requirement would prohibit discounts of the magnitude 
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common in US-style poison pills, undermining the potency of this defence.
147
 
Furthermore, while the management board has some discretion to determine what is in 
the best interest of the company,
148
 the resolution authorizing the non pre-emptive 
convertible bond issue will most likely not withstand judicial scrutiny if the guiding 
consideration was the entrenchment of the members of the management board.  
 
Equity restructuring 
As far as the restructuring defence is concerned, German law is again more restrictive 
than US or UK law, although the difference is less pronounced with respect to the United 
Kingdom due to the harmonising influence of European law. As discussed, interim 
dividends are prohibited and ordinary dividends require shareholder approval. Share buy-
backs must generally be authorized by the shareholders.
149
 Authorization can be given for 
a maximum of five years by resolution adopted with simple majority. The resolution can, 
but does not need to, delineate the purpose of the authorization.
150
 If the shareholders 
grant unlimited authorization for a lengthy period of time it is therefore conceivable that 
the management board will later make use of its powers to defend against a hostile bid 
that the shareholders did not envisage at the time of authorization and which is viewed 
favourably by the shareholders. However, the effectiveness of authorized share buy-backs 
as a takeover defence is limited because their volume is restricted to ten percent of the 
company’s legal capital.151 It may, of course, be a useful device if combined with other 
defences, for example the placement of a block of shares with a friendly third party. 
The statute allows for limited exceptions for management to effect a buy-back 
without shareholder approval. The most relevant in this context provides that the 
company can purchase its own shares where this is ‘necessary in order to prevent the 
company from suffering severe and imminent damage’.152 It is not clear if or when a 
hostile takeover can pose a ‘severe and imminent’ danger. The courts have not yet dealt 
with the issue. Commentators agree that the provision should be interpreted 
restrictively.
153
 Most notably, a danger must exist for the company, i.e., it must be shown 
that there is an immediate risk to the impairment of the company’s assets. The intention 
of the bidder to squeeze out minority shareholders or lay off parts of the workforce does 
not give rise to the threat of ‘imminent damage’ unless there is a clear risk that the 
restructuring will lead to a substantial financial loss for the company, for example 
because the bidder seeks to loot the target.
154
 A large part of the literature rejects the right 
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of the management board to purchase the company’s own shares even in such a case.155 
In any event, the restriction on the volume of share buy-backs mentioned in the previous 
paragraph also applies to a buy-back to avert imminent danger.
156
 
More potent as a defensive measure than share buy-backs are increases of the 
company’s share capital and the placement of a block of shares with a friendly third 
party. An overview of the different forms of capital increase in the Stock Corporation Act 
was given above.
157
 The method offering most flexibility to management, and hence the 
most relevant for our purposes, is authorized capital.
158
 Pursuant to the respective 
provisions, the articles of association can authorize the management board for a period of 
up to five years to increase the share capital by an amount specified in the 
authorization.
159
 If the general meeting resolves to grant the authorization after formation 
of the company, the resolution to amend the articles must be adopted by a majority of 75 
percent.
160
 The volume of the authorized capital is limited to one half of the company’s 
existing legal capital,
161
 but this would clearly be sufficient to defend effectively against a 
large number of takeovers. Furthermore, the shareholder resolution can authorize the 
board to exclude shareholders’ pre-emption rights.162 With the consent of the supervisory 
board, the management board is empowered to determine the rights attached to the newly 
issued shares, provided that the resolution of the general meeting does not contain 
specific instructions in this regard.
163
  
Since authorized capital is widely used in practice and shareholder resolutions 
typically authorize the exclusion of pre-emption rights, the management board is largely 
unconstrained by the Stock Corporation Act in issuing shares to a friendly third party to 
frustrate a takeover bid. Of course, shareholders concerned about managers abusing such 
authorization in a hostile context could impose conditions on the authorization.
164
 Save 
such a limitation, the only substantive constraint imposed on the board’s discretion by the 
Act is the requirement that the issue price of the new shares should not be ‘inadequately 
low’ if pre-emption rights are entirely or partially excluded.165 However, what the Stock 
Corporation Act says, or does not say, is not the end of this story. 
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Additional requirements for the exclusion of pre-emption rights 
In addition to the express requirements for the exclusion of pre-emption rights laid down 
in the Stock Corporation Act, the courts have developed unwritten substantive 
requirements which a resolution of the general meeting and (in the case of authorized 
capital) the subsequent decision of the management board to make a non-preemptive 
issue must conform to. These requirements apply both to the exclusion of pre-emption 
rights in the context of a share issue and an issue of convertible bonds.
166
 They stem from 
a famous line of cases decided by the Federal Court of Justice over the course of 20 years 
towards the end of the last century.
167
 The relevant criteria have changed over time, but 
the doctrine is now well developed and can readily be summarised. In the first of these 
cases, Kali und Salz, which did not deal with authorized capital but a regular capital 
increase against contributions approved by resolution of the general meeting,
168
 the Court 
held that the exclusion of pre-emption rights was only valid if it was justified by 
objective requirements in the interest of the company. The test required the management 
board to balance the conflicting interests of shareholders and the company and determine 
that the exclusion was proportionate, that is, suitable and necessary in light of the board’s 
objectives in issuing the shares.
169
 
 This test was applied by the Court to a capital increase in the form of authorized 
capital and an authorization to exclude shareholders’ pre-emption rights a few years later 
in Holzmann. The Court adopted a strict stance and emphasised that the Kali und Salz 
standard operated at two levels in the case of authorized capital. First, the management 
board was under an obligation to examine whether the exclusion of pre-emption rights 
was an ‘adequate and the most suitable means to pursue preponderant interests of the 
company’ at the time when it wanted to make use of the authorization.170 Second, at the 
time of adoption of the resolution the management board had to provide the general 
meeting with specific facts pointing to the possibility that it will in the future become 
necessary to allot shares non-preemptively.
171
 If no such development could be foreseen 
the authorization would be voidable.
172
 In particular, it was not sufficient to adopt a 
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boilerplate resolution, for example one that authorized management to exclude pre-
emption rights whenever this was necessary ‘to prevent the company from suffering 
damage’.173 
 In Siemens/Nold, a case that was first referred to the ECJ,
174
 the German Federal 
Court of Justice acknowledged that the Holzmann requirements were not practicable in 
the case of authorized capital. In order to give the management board flexibility to react 
quickly to new developments in the capital markets and safeguard the legitimate interests 
of the company not to disclose confidential information, it allowed the board to describe 
the purpose of the capital increase and the parameters of the authorization in abstract 
terms.
175
 The court observed further that at the time of allotment of the shares and 
exclusion of the pre-emption rights the management board had to assess carefully 
whether the specific circumstances that had prompted the board to make use of the 
authorization were in conformity with the abstract parameters laid down in the resolution, 
and whether the share allotment was in the best interest of the company.
176
 Thus, the 
strict Holzmann standard was modified by the Court. However, this does not mean that 
the management board has unfettered discretion to use the authorization as it considers 
appropriate. The courts continue to require that the board disclose the transaction or type 
of transaction it intends to pursue or business policy it wishes to implement by means of 
the capital increase.
177
 The disclosure must be sufficiently precise to set limits to the 
board’s discretion against which the legality of the share allotment and exclusion of pre-
emption rights can be measured.
178
 Accordingly, a statement holding that the capital 
increase was necessary ‘in order to enable the company in the course of a new business 
strategy to acquire shareholdings and/or trademarks and/or licences and/or other assets 
. . . and to allow partners of strategic importance to acquire holdings in the company . . .’ 
without specifying what the new business strategy consisted of, was too broad to pass the 
(modified) test of the Federal Court of Justice.
179
 
 The legislature reacted to the restrictive approach of the Kali und Salz and 
Holzmann decisions by inserting a safe harbour into the Stock Corporation Act.
180
 The 
requirement to balance the interests of shareholders and the company, or to show any 
grounds for justification of the exclusion of preemption rights, does generally
181
 not 
apply if four conditions are met: (1) The shares are issued for contributions in cash, not in 
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kind; (2) the capital increase does not exceed ten percent of the company’s share capital; 
(3) a stock market price exists for the shares;
182
 and (4) the issue price is not significantly 
below that stock market price. However, it should be noted that only the requirements of 
Kali und Salz and its progeny (so-called materielle Beschlusskontrolle) are inapplicable. 
Other obligations stemming from fiduciary duties or the equal treatment principle 
continue to constrain the discretion of the directors.
183
 In addition, the restriction to 
capital increases not exceeding ten percent of the share capital limits the effectiveness of 
the provision as a takeover defence. 
 For our purposes, the following conclusions can be drawn. If the management 
board has been authorized to issue shares (exceeding ten percent of the company’s share 
capital) and exclude pre-emption rights, for example, to finance acquisitions, it is not at a 
later point entitled to allot the shares to a friendly third party in order to frustrate a hostile 
bid. Furthermore, if the board expects the company to become the target of a takeover 
offer and contemplates using additional equity to defend against the bid, it must disclose 
this objective to the general meeting. There are good reasons to assume that an 
authorization that does not go beyond general phrases such as a reference to ‘the interests 
of the company’, or the declared intention to be able to react to ‘new developments in the 
market’ will fail the Court’s test. Thus, even though the law does not provide for ex-post 
shareholder approval of share issues if the general meeting has created authorized capital 
and waived pre-emption rights, the courts have created duties that effectively ensure that 
the shareholders retain a modicum of control after they have granted authorization.
184
 It 
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should also be noted that these requirements restricting the board’s autonomy are, due to 
their binding nature, probably even more effective in preventing abuse of pre-emption 
right waivers than the self-regulatory initiatives of the Pre-Emption Group in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Asset sales / crown jewels defence 
Asset sales fall within the competence of the management board, with the exception of a 
transfer of the entire undertaking of the company.
185
 Therefore, the sale of the company’s 
crown jewels constitutes a takeover defence that can, in principal, be adopted by 
management without involvement of the general meeting - subject to the constraints on 
the discretion of management that will be discussed below. If the company enters into a 
contract to transfer its entire undertaking without effecting a merger or other form of 
business combination pursuant to applicable statutory procedures, which all provide for 
shareholder involvement,
186
 the Stock Corporation Act requires approval of the contract 
by a resolution of the general meeting with at least a 75 percent majority.
187
 The courts 
do not interpret the provision literally. The requirement to procure shareholder approval 
is triggered even where particular assets remain with the company, provided that they are 
of no more than ‘subordinate, ancillary importance’.188 The relevant test is not 
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exclusively quantitative, involving a comparison between the value of the assets that 
remain and those that are transferred. Rather, the courts ask whether the company 
continues to be able to pursue its statutory objects, at least to a limited extent, with the 
remaining assets.
189
 Nevertheless, the threshold is high and a sale of crown jewels that 
does not result in a change in the company’s objects can be carried out by management 
alone.
190
 
 
3.2. General corporate legal restraints on the use of board controlled defences 
3.2.1 The Pre-Takeover Act 2001 Position 
We consider here general principled restrictions on the use of takeover defences in 
German law. The adoption of the 2001 Takeover Act, and its explicit approval of the use 
of takeover defences in certain circumstances, renders the application of these general 
principles partially moot today. However, for our purposes these restrictions remain 
important for two reasons. First, these general principles continue to be of relevance for 
pre-bid-defences
191
 and offers that do not fall within the scope of the Takeover Act.
192
 
Secondly, the 2001 Act is in large part the product of the Takeover Directive process 
initiated by the Commission. To the extent that the 2001 Act overrules pre-existing 
German law that would have constrained the use of takeover defences it raises the 
interesting question of whether the Directive process itself undermined its own objectives 
by altering a pre-Directive neutrality bias in German corporate law. A process that the 
Commission may have thought twice about had they paid attention to Member State 
corporate law. 
 
General duty of neutrality 
The question whether the management board is subject to a general duty not to adopt 
measures that may frustrate a takeover bid was hotly debated before adoption of the 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act of 2001. Both the legal foundation of the duty 
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and its extent are controversial. Court decisions that could provide guidance are rare,
193
 
reflecting the dormant nature of the market for corporate control in Germany for most of 
the last century. Commentators generally rely either on the provisions of the Stock 
Corporation Act that define the powers and competences of the management board
194
 or 
the equal treatment principle
195
 to argue that the board is not entitled to influence the 
ownership structure of the company.
196
 Some endorse a far-reaching duty of neutrality, 
holding that the board is prohibited from adopting any measure that frustrates the bid 
with the exception of: statements by the board that inform the shareholders about the 
advantages or disadvantages of the offer; the search for a competing offer; and the use of 
defences where the offer is likely to cause substantial damage to the company, for 
example by damaging its market position.
197
 Others identify a weaker restraint on 
defensive action involving a requirement that the defensive action is in the interest of the 
target and its shareholders.
198
 A minority denies the existence of a strict duty of neutrality 
and accords the management board greater freedom in deploying potentially frustrating 
devices.
199
 However, this view also acknowledges that the management board does not 
have unfettered discretion to react to a takeover offer as it sees fit, but that it must act in 
the interest of the company, the shareholders, and potentially other stakeholders (such as 
the employees), and not in order to entrench itself.
200
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the existence and parameters of a general duty of 
neutrality remain uncertain, it is uncontroversial that directors’ duties require the board in 
some situations to refrain from adopting measures that tamper with the right of 
shareholders to determine the structure of the company and to decide on fundamental 
changes. While the courts have not addressed the question of an all-encompassing duty of 
neutrality, they have dealt with more specific issues of interference with membership 
rights by the management board. This body of case law is informed by duties that 
safeguard the supremacy of the general meeting in particular transactions. It can, 
accordingly, be understood as shaping the duty of neutrality for the instances that it deals 
with. It lends weight to the thesis that the requirement of board neutrality is an 
undercurrent of large parts of general German corporate law. The next sections will give 
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an overview of the most relevant cases and discuss their implications for takeover 
defences. 
 
Holzmüller and its progeny 
The Stock Corporation Act restricts the broad powers of management in cases that affect 
the rights of shareholders in a fundamental way or that are important to ensure the 
effective control of management, most notably: fundamental changes; increase and 
reduction of capital; appointment of the company’s auditors; and the declaration of 
dividends.
201
 In these cases, corporate action requires a resolution by the general meeting. 
Outside of these specific approval rights, the general meeting does not, however, have the 
right to instruct management to take or refrain from taking a specific action. According to 
the Act, it can decide on matters concerning the management of the company only if 
requested to do so by the management board.
202
 
The statutory allocation of competences was modified by a famous decision of the 
Federal Court of Justice from 1982, which has given rise to the Court’s so-called 
Holzmüller doctrine.
203
 According to the doctrine, the management board is under a duty 
to lay a matter before the general meeting if the board’s actions have the consequence of 
interfering ‘so substantially with the rights of the members and their financial interests 
that the board cannot reasonably assume that it may take a decision in its own right and 
without participation of the general meeting’.204 Directors that do not procure a resolution 
of the general meeting in spite of being required to do so pursuant to the Holzmüller 
doctrine violate their duties under section 93(1) Stock Corporation Act.
205
 Claims for 
damages can be pursued by the company or the shareholders in the form of a derivative 
action.
206
 Furthermore, shareholders can bring a claim for violation of their membership 
rights against the company (not the directors individually), which is directed at a 
declaration that the action of the board is null and void or, if possible, restoration of the 
position prior to the breach of duty.
207
 
 The courts have not had much opportunity to consider the application of the 
Holzmüller doctrine to takeover defences. The Regional Court of Düsseldorf that dealt 
with the Mannesmann takeover
208
 held that defensive measures taken by the management 
board may be, in principle, subject to the requirements established in Holzmüller. 
However, the fact that the company is the target of a takeover does not entail an all-
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encompassing transfer of competences to the general meeting for any actions which can 
prevent the success of the offer.
209
 Rather, the Court argued that it has to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis whether the measure interferes with shareholder rights in a 
fundamental way and is, therefore, comparable to the situation decided in Holzmüller.
210
 
Interference with shareholder rights is not of the required level of intensity if the 
management board actively campaigns against accepting the offer, for example, by 
means of newspaper advertisements, internet announcements or road shows. It may fall 
within the scope of Holzmüller if the board decides to sell important assets or enter into 
contracts outside the normal course of business.
211
 
 After Holzmüller there was much speculation in the lower courts and the literature 
about the threshold necessary to trigger a shift in competences.
212
 Some clarification was 
provided by the Federal Court of Justice in two recent decisions (Gelatine I and II).
213
 
The Court held that the acts of the management board required shareholder approval if 
they touched upon the ‘core competence’ of the general meeting to determine the 
constitution of the company and were in their consequences very similar to those that 
necessitated an alteration of the articles.
214
 The two judgments show that the Court is 
restrictive in its interpretation of the Holzmüller doctrine and considers the allocation of 
power in the Stock Corporation Act as authoritative save in exceptional cases. After 
Gelatine, it is questionable whether asset sales without any further interference with 
shareholder rights continue to be subject to the requirement of shareholder approval.
215
 In 
addition, the quantitative threshold for an application of the doctrine is higher than was 
previously assumed by the courts.
216
 It is now generally accepted that the assets in 
question must amount to 75 to 80 percent of total assets or revenue in order to trigger the 
Holzmüller obligations.
217
 
In light of the clarifications, the decision of the Regional Court Düsseldorf 
discussed above, which was delivered before Gelatine, has to be applied carefully. 
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However, it does not follow that the Holzmüller doctrine has lost its relevance for 
defensive measures unless the 75-80 percent threshold has been reached.
218
 There are 
good reasons why under both Holzmüller and Gelatine the management board does not 
have unfettered discretion to use asset sales as a takeover defence. First, the cases decided 
by the Federal Court of Justice did not involve takeover bids. Thus, the fact that asset 
sales that are effected in the normal course of business may no longer be susceptible to 
violating the Holzmüller principles
219
 does not mean that the same holds if they are used 
to frustrate a hostile bid.
220
 Second, Holzmüller and Gelatine are not only about 
quantitative thresholds. Rather, the test developed by the Court is a bifurcated one, 
comprising both quantitative and qualitative criteria. This can be seen most clearly in 
Gelatine, where the Court distinguishes between the character of the transaction as a 
‘structural measure’ (Strukturmaßnahme) or a transaction comparable to such a measure, 
and the level of intensity of interference with the protected position of the shareholders 
(Wesentlichkeitsschwelle).
221
 Both parts of the test are preconditions for the unwritten 
competence of the general meeting.
222
 In relation to the first part, relevant factors are: the 
close resemblance of the case in issue to any of the express cases of shareholder decision-
making in the Stock Corporation Act or similar acts
223
 (and not only the rules on a 
transfer of the entire undertaking of the company);
224
 an alteration of the structure of the 
company;
225
 an impairment of the shareholders’ financial interests;226 or an interference 
with other membership rights.
227
 The second (quantitative) part is satisfied if the 
alteration of the structure of the company or interference with shareholder rights is 
‘fundamental’228 or ‘severe’229. The two parts of the test are interrelated. What is 
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‘fundamental’ or ‘severe’ is transaction-specific and cannot be answered in generic terms, 
for example by specifying a generally applicable, numerical threshold.
230
 
As regards the first part of the test, takeovers resemble other fundamental changes 
in that a successful takeover leads to new ownership of the company, which, in turn, 
often entails a replacement of management, recalibration of the business strategy, and 
reorganisation of the undertaking. It constitutes a ‘structural measure’ that has manifest 
ramifications for the rights and position of the existing shareholders, both those that 
decide to stay as minority shareholders in the company and those that would like to sell 
out. As far as the second part of the test is concerned, it is suggested that it is more 
meaningful to focus on the effectiveness of the defensive measure, rather than the value 
of the assets that management intends to transfer. In other words, the question should be 
whether the defensive tactic will most likely be successful and as a result shareholders 
will be denied the opportunity to accept the offer and decide about the future of the 
undertaking. The asset sale will interfere in a ‘fundamental’ or ’severe’ way with 
shareholder rights if it is likely to frustrate the takeover, notwithstanding the value of the 
assets. This interpretation is in line with the spirit and purpose of the Holzmüller line of 
cases, which seek to protect shareholders against disenfranchisement.
231
 A more 
significant interference than the denial of the right to decide on a fundamental change is 
hardly imaginable. That the law takes the protection of shareholders against 
disenfranchisement in connection with fundamental changes seriously is also shown by 
the fact that the validity of other fundamental changes (mergers, divisions, change of 
legal form, voluntary winding-up, profit transfer or control agreements) depends on 
shareholder approval by a 75 percent majority and, furthermore, that these requirements 
are mandatory and the articles cannot provide otherwise, for example for a lower 
majority.
232
 
How the courts would assess this situation is, of course, speculation, given that 
the Holzmüller doctrine has only been fleshed out in a rudimentary way with regard to 
takeovers. But these considerations may at least have shown that the issue is not as clear-
cut as sometimes presented in the literature and that the level of shareholder protection in 
takeovers in Germany prior to 2001 when Germany had neither an express board 
neutrality rule nor its 2001 Takeover Act antithesis was far from nonexistent.
233
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3.2.2 Continuing Uncertainty about the Status of Holzmüller 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that the general duty of neutrality is no longer applicable 
after the adoption of the Takeover Act 2001.
234
 However, the implications of the Act for 
the status of Holzmüller are more problematic. In order to appreciate the relationship 
between the Takeover Act and Holzmüller, it is necessary to assess how the two measures 
affect and delineate the position and competences of the board and the shareholders. 
Section 33 of the Takeover Act, which establishes the modified board neutrality rule, is 
generally interpreted as being duty-related. The directors violate their duties if they adopt 
defensive measures that are not in conformity with the provision.
235
 This interpretation is 
convincing. Initially, the draft Takeover Act stipulated that acts of the management board 
and the supervisory board that might result in the takeover offer being frustrated had to 
be authorized by the shareholders in general meeting.
236
 Thus, similar to the measures 
that fall within the competences of the general meeting pursuant to the Stock Corporation 
Act, the draft Takeover Act provided for a shift in competences from the management 
board to the general meeting. This was altered in Parliament. The Act as adopted 
removed the supervisory board from the scope of the board neutrality rule and imposed 
the obligation on the management board ‘not [to] take any actions which could prevent 
the success of the offer’,237 rather than restricting the board’s powers to do so without 
shareholder authorization. Parliament explained that the change was intended to enable 
the board to deploy defensive measures within their competences if the supervisory board 
consented to the measure.
238
 
 In this respect, there is some overlap with Holzmüller, which also refers to duties, 
namely the duty of the management board to procure a decision of the general meeting 
under certain conditions.
239
 In contrast to the express provisions of the Stock Corporation 
Act that require shareholder approval,
240
 this duty-based approach does not interfere with 
the power of the management board to effect transactions on behalf of the company that 
are legally binding in relation to third parties.
241
 However, Holzmüller has a second 
dimension that was emphasized by the subsequent Gelatine judgments.
242
 Non-
compliance with the Holzmüller duties interferes with the membership rights of the 
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shareholders, with the consequence that they have standing to sue, whereas a violation of 
the neutrality rule does not give rise to claims of the shareholders (but only to claims of 
the company for breach of directors’ duties243). That is, one reading of Holzmüller is that 
it is based on a theory of authority or competences, namely that the board does not have 
the authority to take the action where it interferes with the fundamental rights covered by 
Holzmüller. If this is the correct reading of Holzmüller, then the Takeover Act would not 
cover any defensive action that falls within Holzmüller. That is, the Takeover Act would 
not be deemed to authorize defensive board action that affects fundamental shareholder 
rights, because the Act only authorizes the board to use the powers that it has 
defensively.  Indeed, consistent with this view the literature assumes that the ‘classical’ 
Holzmüller doctrine, requiring shareholder approval for reorganizations involving 
transfers of assets exceeding 75-80 percent of total assets, is of continued validity and 
constrains the discretion of the management board to adopt defensive measures, even 
where the supervisory board gives their consent.
244
 If this is correct, then Holzmüller 
could continue to operate as a general restriction on the use of takeover defences as 
outlined above.   
Such a reading would, of course, create a conflict between the legislative approval 
of defensive action and a judicial rule that provides that boards do not have authority to 
take steps that have defensive effects. It is clearly possible, if not probable, that the courts 
would side with the legislative provision or take a narrow reading of  Holzmüller in those 
circumstances. A third possibility is that an authority restriction based on Holzmüller 
would remain, but would only be triggered where the defensive action involved a 
particularly potent interference with shareholder rights, such as a poison pill, but not 
where the defence was less potent, for example, in relation to a low percentage share 
issue or buy-back. Given the difficulty of constructing potent defences in Germany, one 
suspects that we may have to wait a long time to obtain judicial resolution of these 
difficult issues.   
 
3.2.3 The Post-Takeover Act 2001 Position 
 
General principles of corporate law that do not explicitly address board neutrality and 
that are not in conflict with the will of the legislator of the 2001 Act continue to apply 
and constrain the discretion of the directors as they take decisions within the parameters 
of the Takeover Act.
245
 Important, particularly with regard to future changes in corporate 
law that could render a poison pill more readily available than it is today, is the general 
principle of equal shareholder protection. As we have seen above, the standard poison pill 
arrangement is unavailable pursuant to German Corporate law. Small changes in German 
corporate law could, however, but still with ex-ante shareholder approval, make them 
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available. German law would simply need to be amended to allow the issue of naked 
warrants.  
Poison pills are effective because they exclude the right of the bidder who crosses 
the trigger threshold to purchase voting equity in accordance with the terms of the 
warrant. While we have argued that there are good reasons to assume that a pill would 
not be considered discriminatory in the United Kingdom, since it gives all holders of 
shares the same (conditional) right to buy additional shares, the issue may well be 
assessed differently in Germany. The equal treatment principle laid down in the Stock 
Corporation Act is phrased more broadly than its UK counterpart, requiring that 
‘shareholders shall be treated equally under equal conditions’.246 Thus, as opposed to the 
UK Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, the requirement does not refer to ‘the rights 
attaching to [shares]’, but more generally to ‘shareholders’. Unequal treatment may not 
only result from an explicit differentiation between groups of shareholders and the rights 
attaching to their shares, but also from provisions that impose a de facto disadvantage on 
some shareholders but not on others that derives, for example, from the size of their 
shareholding.
247
  
The implications of the equal treatment principle for shareholder rights plans or 
dilutive warrants issued by convertible bonds have not been evaluated by the courts, but a 
decision of the Federal Court of Justice from 1977 (Mannesmann) bears a certain 
resemblance to the problem here at issue and might prove instructive.
248
 The case dealt 
with the introduction of a voting cap in order to insulate the company from control 
changes at a time when the shareholding of at least one investor already exceeded the 
quota thus established. The Court held that under these circumstances the voting cap 
constituted differential treatment that interfered potentially significantly with the voting 
rights of shareholders.
249
 In other words, even though the measure did not differentiate 
between shareholders formally, it fell within the ambit of the equal treatment principle 
because its effects on voting rights were different depending on the size of the 
shareholding. 
 However, simply because corporate action implicates the equal protection 
provision does not mean that it violates the statute. The courts have stressed that the equal 
treatment principle only prohibits the general meeting and the management board from 
distinguishing between shareholders in an arbitrary manner, ie without objective 
justification.
250
 In Mannesmann the differential treatment was justified because it was 
held to be necessary ‘to shield the company from external forces obtaining control, 
strengthen the independence of the management board, and protect small shareholders 
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against the dominating influence of blockholders.’251 While this holding is relatively 
permissive, it is important to note that the voting cap was introduced by resolution of the 
general meeting, not by board action. Based on the limited authority available, German 
courts would impose a more demanding standard on the use of board-controlled takeover 
defences if they resulted in the disenfranchisement or dilution of particular of 
shareholders. This can be seen clearly in the case of the exclusion of preemption rights 
and allotment of shares to selected shareholders, which needs to be justified in 
accordance with the principles established by the Kali und Salz line of cases.
252
 
Accordingly, in our view, there is reason to think that a standard poison pill 
(assuming it could be put in place) would violate the German equal protection of 
shareholders provision unless the shareholders explicitly authorized their issue as a 
defensive measure or the bidders’ actions represented a serious threat to the company as a 
going concern. 
  
3.3 Practical effectiveness 
The discussion so far has shown that even in the absence of an express duty of neutrality 
the availability of most takeover defences is restricted. Therefore, the question whether, 
and to what extent, the defences would be practically effective is a largely theoretical 
exercise. All of the defence types addressed in this paper are subject to significant 
restrictions on availability and use. There is little that is formally available. What is 
formally available is of limited potency. However, for purposes of completeness we 
consider briefly the issue of practical effectiveness under German corporate law. 
In several respects, German law is less shareholder-friendly than that of the 
United Kingdom when it comes to the removal of directors. Since the members of the 
management board are appointed by the supervisory board,
253
 the first step toward 
replacing the management of the target company is the replacement of the members of 
the supervisory board.
254
 Supervisory board members serve a maximum term of five 
years.
255
 The articles may provide for a staggered board, although this is not common in 
German companies.
256
 A bidder who obtains a qualified majority can, of course, amend 
the articles and repeal the staggered board provision. The members of the supervisory 
board can be removed before expiration of their term of office without cause by three-
fourths majority.
257
 However, the new supervisory board, in turn, can only remove the 
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members of the management board for ‘an important reason’ before their term of office 
expires.
258
 A change of control is not considered an ‘important reason’.259 Therefore, the 
bidder in general needs to procure a vote of no confidence by the general meeting, which 
will then enable the supervisory board to remove the members of the management 
board.
260
 Note in this regard that 5% of the shareholder body have a mandatory right to 
call a shareholder meeting.
261
 
Finally, apart from the cases specified in the Stock Corporation Act (and extended 
by Holzmüller) that require shareholder approval, the general meeting does not have the 
right to engage in decision-making unless requested to do so by the management 
board.
262
 Therefore, as mentioned, the shareholders are not entitled to give instructions to 
the management board and cannot instruct management to remove defences that have 
been put in place earlier. 
Accordingly, board members that deploy the available defences benefit from a 
greater degree of removal protection than the board of a UK company. However, as 
compared to the protection which Delaware removal rights provide Delaware directors, 
directors of widely-held German companies are more exposed. In contrast to a Delaware 
corporation with a staggered board, they could all be removed at any time by a 
shareholder meeting committed to their removal – enabling the redemption of any pill 
that is put in place – and they cannot, as many Delaware directors can, take comfort in a 
guaranteed cool off period, until the next annual shareholder meeting, following the 
successful defence of a bid. 
 
3.4 Summary 
If the Takeover Directive provided for a mandatory board neutrality rule it would have 
the important effect of removing the Takeover Act 2001. However, its actual impact on 
the contestability of widely-held German companies would be limited. US type poison 
pills are not available because they require a flexibility that the German corporate law 
cannot offer. A qualified version of the pill could, albeit with some practical difficulty, be 
put in place through an ex ante nominal convertible bond issued with shareholder 
approval. If the practical difficulties can be overcome, any such constructed defence 
requires explicit ex-ante shareholder approval and is subject to ex-post constraint of the 
equal protection standard. As far as the equity restructuring defence is concerned, the 
Stock Corporation Act provides for ex-ante shareholder approval. Shareholders could, if 
concerned about ex-post manipulation of the authorization, place conditions on the 
authorization. If the management board has been authorized to allot shares and exclude 
pre-emption rights, the case law developed by the Federal Court of Justice has, in relation 
to greater than 10 percent non-preemptive issues, supplemented the statutory provisions 
with duties that require the proportionality of the decision of the management board and a 
description of the envisaged use of the authorization in the resolution creating the 
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authorized capital. Furthermore, as the recent Hochtief-ACS takeover demonstrates, a 10 
percent share issue defence has a limited defensive impact.  
Of the three takeover defences analysed in this article, only the crown jewels 
defence, the least potent defensive tactic, can potentially be deployed by management 
without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder involvement. However, the courts have refined the 
statutory allocation of competences and require shareholder approval where the 
transaction interferes fundamentally with membership rights. which is understood to 
mean where the value of the assets exceeds the high threshold of 75-80 percent and the 
sale has an ‘intermediating effect’.263  Directors using these defences in the face of a 
shareholder base that wishes to accept the offer may feel safer in their jobs than would 
their UK counterparts (in the absence of the UK non-frustration principle) but will be far 
less secure than their Delaware counterparts. They are likely to use them for 
entrenchment purposes rather warily.  
In relation to even these limited formally available defences, in the pre-2001 
German corporate legal context, such defences would, we have argued, have been subject 
to significant principled-based constraints. These constraints were partly disposed of by 
the 2001 Act. While German corporate law maintains even today a strong anti-takeover 
defence bias, as it limits the construction of these defences, it seems likely that had the 
Commission never started its Takeover Directive journey, German corporate law’s anti-
defence bias would have been even stronger.     
 
 
4.  DOES ITALY’S OPT-OUT FROM THE BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE MATTER?  
  
The newly enacted regime implementing the Takeover Directive, which came into force 
in July 2010, does not impose a mandatory board neutrality rule and makes the 
reciprocity exception available.
264
 This approach closely mirrors the principles 
underlying the 2008 reform
265
 of the original transposition of the Takeover Directive.
266
  
The initial implementing rules, which came into effect in December 2007,
 
were 
based on a strong non-frustration principle
267
 with a reciprocity option
268
 and essentially 
confirmed the pre-existing takeover regime.
269
 Unless authorized by a post bid
270
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resolution adopted by shareholders representing at least 30% of the company’s 
outstanding share capital, directors of an Italian listed company had to refrain from taking 
corporate actions which might result in the frustration of the bid.  
It was the credit crisis that brought about a ‘change of heart’ in relation to the 
board neutrality rule in 2008.
271
 Concerns about the vulnerability of Italian companies to 
takeovers following the fall in stock prices resulted in Italian regulators electing to make 
the board neutrality rule optional and allowing companies who opted-in to subject the 
opt-in to a reciprocity requirement.
272
  
The protectionist trend, albeit in a watered down version,
273
 continues under the 
current regime where both the non frustration and the breakthrough rules remain 
optional.
274
 What has changed is the direction of choice in implementing the opt-out 
mechanism offered by the Takeover Directive.
275
 Italian companies are now subject to 
the board neutrality rule, unless they opt-out of the provision by amending their articles 
of association.
276
 The reversal in the board neutrality opt-in arrangements adopted in 
2008 addressed a specific corporate governance issue.
277
 In the case of a company with a 
concentrated share ownership structure, which is typical in Italy, controlling shareholders 
with significantly less than 50% of the voting rights could block any opt-in resolution. 
Moreover, in the absence of any board initiative, the requirement for a supermajority vote 
exacerbated coordination problems among shareholders, rendering the (opt-in) option de 
facto unavailable.
278
 By making the board neutrality rule the default rule the 2010 
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reforms alleviate this problem. A resolution passed with the support of 2/3 of the votes 
cast at the meeting
279
 is now required to opt-out of the board neutrality rule.
280
  
Where a company has not opted-out of the neutrality rule, the 2010 implementing 
legislation provides exceptions to the strict prohibition which are consistent with those 
permitted by the Takeover Directive, namely seeking alternative bids
281
 and the 
implementation of any decision taken before the start of bid which falls within the normal 
business practices of the company.
282
 In short, unless a company has opted-out of the 
neutrality rule, in Italy the board of the target company is not allowed to take any action 
which may result in the frustration of a takeover bid if it has not been authorized by a 
post-bid shareholder resolution.
283
  
 The history of Italian takeover defence regulation in the last 5 years takes us 
through all the available board neutrality rule options available: a mandatory rule; its 
default non-application, and finally its default application.  The question we ask in this 
section is whether when one takes into account the background corporate law rules in 
Italy, do any of these approaches matter very much to the contestability of Italian 
companies? Do any of these three choices make more than a trivial difference to the 
defensive capabilities of an Italian board? Following the structure set forth in the other 
sections of this article we ask whether under Italian corporate law our identified defence 
types are formally available, whether they can be deployed by the board, and if deployed 
whether they are practically effective.  
 
4.1 Formal Availability 
An Italian poison pill?  
It is uncertain whether a typical US-style shareholder rights plan complies with Italian 
law. As the lack of case law suggests, the issue is more of theoretical interest than of 
practical significance.  
Poison pills involve the issuance of warrants as interim dividends to all existing 
shareholders. This is possible under Italian law. The general principle is that dividends 
are payable (even in kind) when declared by an ordinary resolution passed by the general 
meeting that approves the annual accounts, provided that accumulated profits have been 
actually made and duly documented in the balance sheet.
284
 If the articles so permit, 
directors of listed companies can distribute interim dividends when the previous financial 
year’s approved audited accounts do not show losses relating to that fiscal year or the 
previous fiscal years.
285
 The articles of association of Italian listed companies would 
typically provide such authority to the directors.  
Whilst the default rule is that shareholder authorization (to raise capital
286
 and to 
grant options) is required under Italian law, the articles (or a subsequent amendment of 
the articles
287
 adopted by supermajority resolution passed by two thirds of the votes cast 
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at the meeting
288
) may also authorize the board to increase capital one or more times, up 
to a specified amount
289
 and within a maximum period of five years from the date of 
incorporation or the amending resolution.
290
 If such authorization is not large enough to 
support the granting of an option to buy a share for every existing issued share, the board 
would have to return to the shareholder body to obtain an additional authorization and in 
the process of so doing would clearly have to explain the purpose behind the increased 
authorization.   
Once in place, there is, however, some uncertainty about whether the pill could be 
effectively triggered because it is not clear that the bidder can be excluded from 
exercising the warrants and whether shares can be issued at a discount to the current 
market price. Two positions can be broadly identified. The conventional view is skeptical 
on the availability of a typical US-style shareholder rights plan in Italy
291
 and argues that 
it probably violates the default principle of equal treatment among shareholders.
292
 More 
specifically, it maintains that in order to exclude the bidder from exercising the warrants 
and purchasing newly issued shares for cash, pre-emption rights have to be waived just as 
they do under the ordinary rules for the raising of share capital. This is possible only in 
two circumstances. First, when the articles, or a subsequent shareholder resolution,
293
 
allow the board to issue shares to raise capital in an amount not exceeding ten per cent of 
the outstanding shares and the issue price is equal to the market value of the shares as 
stated in a special report certified by an auditing company.
294
 Secondly, ‘when the 
interest of the company requires it’ and the authority has been granted to the board by a 
resolution passed by shares representing more than half of the company’s outstanding 
capital.
295
 These exceptions, however, are of limited assistance in constructing an 
effective poison pill. The ten per cent cap imposed by the first exception is insufficient to 
issue a pill and the restriction on issuing shares at a discount removes the dilutive effect 
of the pill, rendering it completely ineffective.
296
 The second exception requires a 
resolution passed by 50% of the company’s outstanding capital to authorize the board to 
issue the shares non pre-emptively and, in addition, shares must be issued at a price 
calculated on the basis of the net value of the assets, having regard to the share price 
trend during the last semester (emissione con sovrapprezzo).
297
 Again, this destroys the 
dilutive effect of the pill.  
 The above orthodox approach has been recently challenged. Some commentators 
have suggested that a shareholder rights plan does not per se infringe the principle of 
equal treatment among shareholders nor does it necessarily violate the pre-emption right 
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principle.
298
 These commentators argue that the execution of the plan is the outcome of a 
contractual arrangement entered into between the company and the shareholders which 
provides that on the occurrence of a triggering event the party that crosses the specified 
ownership threshold will be prevented from exercising the warrants and from subscribing 
for the newly issued shares.
299
 In line with the ratio of the Delaware Supreme Court 
decision in Baker v Providence & Worcester,
300
 which distinguished between 
discrimination among shareholders (legal) and discrimination among shares (illegal), in 
the case of a takeover bid discriminating amongst shareholders ‘who are not in the same 
conditions’ (‘che non si trovino in identiche condizioni’) does not infringe the principle 
of equal treatment among shareholders ‘in the same conditions’ (‘che si trovino in 
identiche condizioni’) established by article 92 CFSA.301 Moreover, for proponents of 
this position when the warrants are issued, pre-emption rights are also protected as they 
are issued proportionately to all the shareholders (aumento di capitale riservato al 
servizio del warrant). It is only on the occurrence of the triggering event that the 
contractual provisions contained in the shareholder rights plan (well known ex ante to 
shareholders) will prevent the bidder from exercising the warrants. Pre-emption rights are 
in this case ‘absorbed’ into the contractual options (opzioni di secondo grado) set forth in 
the warrants.
302
 
Although the proponents of validity put forward a strong case, the concerns 
articulated by the conventional view are difficult to entirely rebut. The issuance of 
warrants pursuant to a shareholder rights plan is likely to be seen by the courts as a way 
of (contractually) circumventing pre-emption rights.
303
 This obstacle should not be 
underestimated because the implementation of a shareholder rights plan following a 
triggering event by issuing shares at  a discount would infringe the rules on the pricing of 
shares when pre-emption rights are waived (emissione con sovrapprezzo).
304
 
 
Equity Restructuring 
Equity restructuring defences in Italy are all subject to a significant degree of shareholder 
control. As noted above in the analysis of poison pills, article 2443 of the Civil Code 
provides that the articles (or a supermajority resolution that alters the articles) can confer 
on the directors the power to allot new shares one or more times, up to a specified amount 
and within a specified period of up to five years. It is common that in listed companies 
this power is granted on a rolling basis although, as a survey on the articles of the 
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companies comprised in the FTSE MIB index
305
 shows, apart from a few exceptions,
306
 
the rolling authorizations are typically lower than in the UK.
307
 That said, as in the UK, 
shareholders have the power to subject such authorization to conditions
308
 and may retain 
the power to revoke (or to adjust the terms of) the authority granted to the directors until 
shares have been allotted.
309
  
Article 2443 of the Civil Code also provides that the pre-emption rights of 
existing shareholders may be waived in a number of cases when the guidelines set forth 
in the articles are followed by directors (i criteri cui gli amministratori devono 
attenersi).
310
 First, if shares are issued for in-kind consideration and the reasons for the 
exclusion and the methods adopted for the determination of the issue price are clearly 
stated.
311
 Second, where the articles, or a super majority shareholder resolution,
312
 
authorize the board to issue shares amounting to less than ten percent of the outstanding 
share capital, provided that the issue price is equal to the market value of the shares and 
this is certified by a special report of the company’s auditors.313 A survey of the articles 
of the companies comprised in the FTSE MIB index shows that the authorization 
required for the board to make use of this exception is not often inserted in the 
companies’ articles. Rolling shareholder waivers of pre-emption rights of this kind are 
relatively rare.
314
 Third, if the ‘interest of the company requires it’ when directors have 
been authorized by a resolution passed by a majority of fifty per cent of the company’s 
outstanding capital which specifies the criteria to be followed by the directors for 
indentifying the purchasers and for determining the issue price.
315
  
In Italy therefore, as in the UK, in theory, there is scope for management to use 
the rolling grants of authority to allot shares coupled with the formal availability of the 
exceptions to the pre-emption regime for defensive purposes. Importantly, as in the UK, 
Italian corporate law provides the means to control any ‘abuse’ of this defensive 
capability. Any perception of managerial abuse could result in a reduction in such rolling 
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grants, or where such rolling grants are viewed as important for other business purposes, 
a market practice of more restrictive conditions being applied to such grants could 
develop. Given the current context of Italian ownership structures,
316
 it is of course 
difficult to predict such behavioral patterns. 
 With regard to share buy-backs to enhance the proportionate ownership of a 
friendly shareholder or insider, or to effect green mail, under Italian corporate law it is 
not possible for a company to purchase its own shares using its financial resources 
without shareholder approval.
317
 Such repurchases can only be made out of profits 
available for distribution
318
 and within the quantitative (the maximum number of shares 
to be purchased) and temporal (the period of the authorization cannot exceed eighteen 
months) boundaries set forth in a shareholders’ resolution.319 The number of the shares 
purchased cannot exceed ten percent of the share capital, which for the purpose of this 
calculation includes the treasury shares already held by company and its subsidiaries.
320
  
 
Asset Sales/Crown Jewels Defences 
The general difficulties of deploying an asset sale defence in any jurisdiction have been 
noted above. However, these difficulties notwithstanding, the defence is formally 
available to an Italian company as under Italian law there is no shareholder approval 
requirement for an asset sale when the sale is made in pursuit of the corporate objects (in 
attuazione dell’oggetto sociale).321 
 
 
4.2 General corporate legal restraints on the use of the board controlled defences 
The default position under Italian law is that the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company,
322
 unless otherwise provided by law
323
 or the company’s 
articles. This position was reinforced in the 2003 Company law reform, which greatly 
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eroded the power of the general meeting to interfere with the management of the 
company.
324
 In this section, we ask whether there are any generally applicable restrictions 
on the exercise of these powers for defensive purposes. More specifically we ask whether 
the exercise of the powers for defensive purposes is restricted by obligations of loyalty or 
other rules requiring shareholder involvement when powers are used defensively.  
It is disputed whether Italian law adopts a different standard of review for the duty 
of loyalty and the duty of care. In the past this was not the case and the standard for both 
duties was based on an objective diligent director standard set forth in article 1710 of the 
Civil Code (diligenza del mandatario).
325
 Managerial discretion was permitted on rather 
unsettled grounds by reference to the general principles on the law of obligations 
(obbligazioni di mezzi). That said, following the Company law reform in 2003, it has 
been argued
326
 that a distinction between the two duties can be drawn even in the absence 
of provisions in the Code to this effect. More specifically, it has been suggested that the 
duty to manage the company in pursuit of the company’s objects (le operazioni 
necessarie per l’attuazione dell’oggetto sociale)327 can be identified as the source for the 
duty of loyalty. If this view is correct, then it is surely a subjective duty:
328
 it is what the 
actual director believed in good faith to be the company’s best interest at the time the 
decision was taken. Accordingly, any exercise of power for defensive purposes must 
comply with the (objective/subjective) standard of care of a diligent manager
329
 and, 
although there is some residual uncertainty in this regard, be taken in what the director 
believes furthers the company’s objects.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned uncertainty regarding the role of a loyalty 
obligation in directors’ decision making and the director primacy bias of contemporary 
Italian corporate law, the Civil Code imposes some indirect restrictions on board action 
by encouraging, in certain circumstances, shareholder involvement in the decision 
making process. Before the enactment of the Company law reform in 2003, article 2364 
no. 4 of the Civil Code provided for the possibility of ex ante shareholder ratification of 
board decisions (especially) when there was scope for controversy as to whether the 
matter in question was a matter for managerial discretion or rather involved essential 
shareholder interests.
330
 The meaning and effect of the rule was, however, unclear. In the 
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absence of a significant body of case law,
331
 commentators put forward two different 
interpretations. One view
332
 argued for the exclusive managerial competence of the 
directors, dismissing the need for shareholder authorization unless it was obtained in 
order to provide directors with a liability waiver against possible future claims. Another, 
and more convincing interpretation,
333
 suggested that even in the absence of a specific 
mandatory requirement, the need for shareholder authorization under certain conditions 
was indispensable to fulfill the general directors’ duties and good faith (regole generali di 
comportamento che sovraintendono la condotta degli amministratori e il principio di 
buona fede). In this respect, the list of circumstances broadly included decisions of 
fundamental interest for the company (interesse primordiale dei soci),
334
 such as the sale 
of essential company assets. In our view, pre-2003 a strong case could be made that 
article 2364 no. 4 could be read to require shareholder approval for the use of defences to 
intentionally interfere with a takeover bid. At a minimum it would have constrained the 
use of a substantial asset sale defence, which as identified above, is the only defence that 
could be deployed without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder approval.  
The Company law reform in 2003 unexpectedly
335
 repealed article 2364 no. 4 of 
the Civil Code. The doctrinal debate above is, therefore, of limited importance today.
336
 
Beyond few specific exceptions provided by the law,
337
 there is no general requirement 
for shareholder authorization of managerial decisions.
338
 Nevertheless, it is usual 
practice, and viewed by some commentators as a necessary precondition to satisfying a 
director’s duties of care and loyalty, that when directors take decisions which are of 
fundamental interest for the company, they should request a non-binding opinion from 
the shareholders and should subsequently explain the reason for not following such 
opinion.
339
 The effect of this practice and expectation is to impose an advisory 
shareholder vote requirement where formally available defences are deployed by the 
board. 
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4.3 Practical effectiveness 
The inquiry above has shown that some board-controlled post-bid defences are 
theoretically available and consistent with corporate principles of Italian law. The extent 
of their formal availability is, however, in the absence of shareholder authorization, 
limited (if not negligible). Only asset sale defences can be implemented without any 
shareholder involvement and if used for defensive purposes a strong case can be made 
that the board should refer the matter to shareholders for an advisory opinion. There is 
some scope to use ex-ante authorization to issue shares for defensive purposes. However, 
Italian law would, in theory, allow shareholders to restrict board authority to issue the 
shares by placing conditions on any rolling grants of authority if their possible defensive 
use, is perceived to be abusive.  Their defensive use would also trigger the advisory vote 
expectation referred to above.  
 It may be possible (although, as outlined above, highly contestable and, on the 
balance of probabilities, unlikely) to put in place a poison pill with ex ante shareholder 
approval. Assuming that the significant difficulties for construction of the pill can be 
overcome, it is important to ask, as we asked in the context of the United Kingdom, 
whether such a potentially potent defence could be used to entrench management instead 
of benefiting the company and the shareholders. For the same reasons we gave in the 
context of the UK, the answer appears to be no. Under Italian law directors may be 
removed from office without cause by a resolution passed by a simple majority of the 
votes cast
340
 and a meeting can be called by shareholders who hold five per cent of the 
company’s issued shares (or the lower percentage provided in the articles).341 Upon the 
shareholders’ request, directors have to call a meeting ‘without delay’342 and if they fail 
to do so, the meeting may be called by court order.
343
 It follows that directors who keep a 
pill in place against the clear wishes of its shareholders are likely to face a proxy fight 
resulting in capitulation or removal.  
This same background rule set is relevant for the directors when considering the 
consequences of using available defences in opposition to shareholder wishes. In relation 
to the asset sale defence - the only defence that can be deployed without ex-ante or ex-
post shareholder approval - the practical expectation that an advisory shareholder opinion 
will be obtained allows the shareholders to make their views very clear. Directors who 
ignore such views in a hostile context are likely to find their post-bid position somewhat 
precarious, even in a widely held company. This is a distinguishing feature of the Italian 
legal framework as compared to the United States, and renders the effectiveness of board-
controlled post-bid defences questionable in practice. 
 
4.4 Summary 
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In conclusion, in our view the background corporate law rule set in Italian law renders the 
board neutrality changes that have taken place in the past five years of limited import. 
When analyzed through the lens of our three primary takeover defences, the decision 
whether to have a mandatory or default neutrality principle, and whether to make it opt-in 
or opt-out is of limited consequence. The most potent of such defences, the poison pill, is 
in all likelihood not available. No formally available defence can be deployed without 
shareholder involvement – either ex-ante approval or an ex-post advisory shareholder 
opinion. Such authorization or opinion will invariably require the specification of the 
defensive purpose of the authorization. Once made available, the rules on removal rights 
and the calling of shareholder meetings impose significant informal restraints on how 
directors use those defences. It is true, however, that in contrast to the UK’s improper 
purpose doctrine or the pre-2001 Holzmüller doctrine as applied to takeover defences, 
that there is no overarching rule that would prohibit new and innovative defences without 
shareholder approval. But as we noted in Section 1, we consider the likelihood of such 
innovations to be very low. Interestingly, there was such a general rule at the time the 
Takeover Directive was being finalized but it unexpectedly disappeared in 2003.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis set forth in this article suggests that there are two axes upon which we can 
assess the significance or triviality of the adoption of a board neutrality rule in European 
Union Member States. The first axis is the extent to which a Member States’ adoption of 
an unqualified board neutrality rule makes a consequential difference to the ability of 
boards to fashion and deploy defences without requesting shareholder approval to do so: 
without a board neutrality rule does corporate law provide the tools to boards to construct 
defences and does it allow them to be used without restraint? If one emerges with a 
positive response from the analysis of these questions, the second axis comes into play, 
namely, the potency of such available defences. There are two elements that structure 
defence potency: the first depends upon the nature of the defence itself – an asset sale, for 
example, is significantly less potent than a poison pill; the second element is the 
background corporate governance rules such as rules on director removal and the calling 
of shareholder meetings that enable or restrain the defences’ deployment for non-
corporate / non-shareholder value purposes.  
In all three of our selected jurisdictions we have seen that there are multiple and 
overlapping fields of regulation. And in each of these jurisdictions there is variation in 
the importance and effectiveness of these different fields of regulation: variation in what 
does the work of restricting board defensive power. The rules restricting formal 
availability are, for example, more important in Germany and Italy - where there are 
serious doubts about the formal availability of a poison pill or similar mechanism even 
with ex-ante shareholder approval – than in the UK. General rules requiring explicit 
shareholder authorization to use board power for defensive purposes are more important 
in the UK (the improper purpose doctrine) and Germany (the Holzmüller doctrine) than 
in Italy. In the UK and Italy, the background corporate governance rule set is a stronger 
constraint on the potency of available defences than it is in Germany where supervisory 
board and management board removal is more difficult. However, whilst there is 
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variation in the role played by these different fields of regulation in each of the three 
jurisdictions, the conclusions we have reached for the UK, Germany and Italy are very 
similar. Although we acknowledge variation in the strength of the argument, the case for 
the triviality of the board neutrality rule can be made in each country.   
In the UK the non-frustration rule is trivial. Only asset sale defences are available 
without shareholder involvement and even their use requires specific ex-ante or ex-post 
defensive authorization from the shareholders. Where explicit authorization is granted ex-
ante to construct and deploy defences the background rule set and the role of UK 
institutional investors would prevent their use for any purpose that was not compellingly 
justified in terms of corporate and shareholder betterment. In Germany, poison pills are 
unavailable, although their functional substitutes may be with explicit shareholder 
approval and considerable practical difficulty; share issues of greater than 10% of the 
outstanding shares require, in effect, explicit shareholder authorization to be used 
defensively. This leaves less than 10% share issues and share buy-backs with a general 
ex-ante shareholder authorization (that may always be subject to shareholder imposed 
conditionality) and only asset sales requiring no authorization (subject to Holzmüller). 
But asset sales are not potent defences – they are difficult to put in place in the tight time 
constraints of a bid and may be unavailable if the sold assets are closely interconnected 
with the remaining assets.  
Of our three jurisdictions, Italy arguable presents the weakest case for the 
triviality thesis. Whilst we think that a strong case can be made that poison pills are not 
formally available at all in Italy, there is some doubt about this. But even if available they 
would require ex-ante authorization in order to issue a large grant of warrants. 
Furthermore, asset sale defences are available without shareholder involvement and there 
is scope to issue a sizeable block of shares non pre-emptively to friendly third parties, but 
again with ex-ante shareholder authorization. Importantly, shareholders unhappy about 
managerial abuse of defensive capability could put a stop to this by imposing conditions 
on rolling grants of the authorization to allot shares. Furthermore, there is under Italian 
law a soft requirement to obtain the shareholders’ view of defensive actions, but this is 
more of a market practice supported by academic commentary than a legal rule. As in the 
UK, the background Italian corporate governance rule set is strongly pro-shareholder and 
would constrain board use of these defences for entrenchment purposes.  
What does this mean for the Takeover Directive’s approach to its anticipated 
review of the implementation and effect of the board neutrality rule in the European 
Union? We cannot, of course, extrapolate from these three Member States to the 
remaining 24. However, what is clear from this article’s findings is that there is a distinct 
possibility that the board neutrality rule is not merely trivial for the Member States 
analysed in this paper but trivial for the European Union as a whole. Accordingly, 
looking only at the adoption or rejection of the board neutrality rule by the Member 
States does not enable us to draw any conclusions about the extent to which boards of 
European companies can use defences to entrench themselves or throw sand in the 
wheels of European economic integration.  
What is also clear from this analysis is that corporate law in European Member 
States provides regulation of takeover defences just as it provides for the regulation of 
any exercise of corporate power. Such regulation represents a balance of board and 
shareholder power that has evolved since the 19
th
 century. Such a balance of power 
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readily addresses surprises that may arise from how boards deploy corporate power. A 
mandatory board neutrality rule cuts through this crafted balance of power and in so 
doing, as any bright line does, overreaches itself. This is seen most clearly where it 
prevents informed shareholders from ex-ante electing to allow boards to use and control 
board power for defensive purposes when a hostile bid is made. Approaching 140 years 
ago in a different context where board loyalty was questioned, a famous English Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Hatherley, when asked to overrule the election that shareholders had 
made in the articles, observed  that it was not ‘for the Court to lay down rules for the 
guidance of men who are adult, and can manage and deal with their own interests’.344 It 
would, he observed, have been be ‘a violent assumption if any thing of that kind were 
attempted’. We see in Germany, the UK and also in Italy that it is difficult for boards to 
maneuver defensively without explicit shareholder approval, and that the balance of 
power allows shareholders to respond if managers overstep the mark. And we see from 
the United States that widely-held shareholders, often led by the bidder as shareholder but 
also pre-emptively prior to a bid,
345
 are not in this context cowered by rational apathy. In 
European Member States where the situation is similar to Germany, the UK and Italy it 
would indeed, therefore, be a ‘violent assumption’ to assume that a board neutrality rule 
would be beneficial for companies and shareholders and that it should be imposed 
through European legislation.  
A practical conclusion follows from our analysis. In order to determine whether 
or not the board neutrality rule is an important regulatory tool that would justify revision 
of the Directive to make it a mandatory rule within the European Union, the Commission 
should carry out the type of analysis set forth in this article for all Member States. If the 
analysis of the corporate law of these Member States suggests that the corporate legal 
restrictions on defensive action are as significant as they are in the UK, Germany or Italy, 
then in our view it would be time for the European Commission to hang up its neutrality 
boots. There are more important matters that require its attention.   
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